Corporate Taxation and Corporate Governance

公共财政经济学家对税收的经济效应进行了深入的讨论，但他们在分析中几乎完全忽略了代理问题的可能性。反之亦然，与公司治理相关的代理问题主要由商业和金融经济学家分析，他们大多从税收中抽象出来。因此，直到最近，税收和公司治理之间的联系一直被广泛忽视，尽管税收和公司治理之间似乎有几个重要而深刻的联系。了解税收激励和管理行为之间的相互作用对实际税收政策也有特别重要的影响，因为管理资源的耗散以各种方式损害企业生产力，从而损害经济增长。本研究旨在揭示企业所得税和资本所得税对委托代理问题（即股东（委托人）和管理者（代理人）之间的利益失调）严重程度的影响的不同机制，并为税收与公司治理问题之间的不同互动模式提供良好的理论基础。由于税收与公司治理之间的相互作用是多方面的，并且通过各种不同的直接或间接机制出现，因此该主题提供了广泛的有趣且高度相关的研究问题。这两个具体问题是在研究项目中考虑的。1. 财务成本扣除条款对跨国企业管理激励的影响。2. 公司利润双重征税对最优管理合同（无条件工资支付vs激励薪酬）的影响，以遏制管理机会主义。

Public finance economists have intensively discussed the economic effects of taxation but they have almost completely ignored the possibility of agency problems in their analyses. Vice versa, agency problems associated with corporate governance have been predominantly analysed by business and financial economists, who mostly abstract from taxes. Consequently, the link between taxation and corporate governance has been widely neglected until recently even though there seem to be several important and well profound linkages between taxation and corporate governance. The understanding of the interplay between tax incentives and managerial behaviour has also particularly important implications for actual tax policy as managerial resource dissipation harms firm productivity in various ways and therewith economic growth. The aim of the research project is to shed light on different mechanism explaining the impact of corporate and capital income taxes on the severeness of the principal agent problem, i.e. the misalignment of interests, between shareholders (principal) and managers (agents) and to provide a sound theoretical underpinning for the different modes of interaction between taxation and corporate governance problems. Since the interaction between taxation and corporate governance is manifold and appears via various different direct or indirect mechanisms, this topic offers a wide range of interesting and highly relevant research questions. The two specific problems are considered within the research project. 1. The influence of deductibility provisions for the cost of finance on managerial incentives in multinational enterprises. 2. The impact of the double taxation of corporate profits on optimal managerial contracting (unconditional wage payments vs. incentive pay) to curb managerial opportunism.