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CAREER: Mechanism Design

CAREER: Mechanism Design
职业:机构设计
批准号:
0846113
负责人:
Jason Hartline
金额:
$40.0万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
2009
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2009-01-01 至 2014-12-31
关键词:

项目摘要

项目成果

Jason Hartline的其他基金

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中文摘要
翻译
由于自私的用户行为,互联网系统表现不佳;示例包括垃圾邮件、免费下载、链接垃圾邮件和包泛滥。如何设计一个多用户系统,如计算机网络,使其在存在自私用户行为的情况下运行良好?机制设计领域为设计和分析计算机网络中的协议、服务和应用程序奠定了经济基础,在这些网络中,用户可能会自私地为自己的最佳利益行事。经典的机构设计文献在不同程度上给出了严格的数学工具,从中可以推导出最优的机构。不幸的是,除了少数情况外,最佳机制是复杂的,高度依赖于设置的细节,并且不切实际。哈特兰博士详细地阐述了这些批评,他的项目包括一个紧密相连的研究议程,以发展与计算机系统相关的机制设计理论。该项目将为设计通用、简单和实用的机制发展一种理论。计算机系统的机制必须是通用的——事实上,互联网的成功部分归功于大多数互联网协议在广泛的工作负载下工作。互联网的机制必须是简单的,如果它们被多个维度参数化,它们就很难优化。与此形成对比的是,古典经济理论给出了复杂的机制,这些机制不可避免地依赖于环境。最后,互联网的机制必须切实可行;这个项目解决了在机械设计的计算机科学文献中理论与实践之间的脱节。
英文摘要
Internet systems perform suboptimally because of selfish user behavior; examples include email spam, freeloading, link spam, and packet flooding. How should a multi-user system such as a computer network be designed such that it operates well in the presence of selfish user behavior? The field of mechanism design lays the economic foundations for the design and analysis of protocols, services, and applications in computer networks where users may act selfishly in their own best interest. With varying degrees of clarity, the classical mechanism design literature gives rigorous mathematical tools from which optimal mechanisms can be derived. Unfortunately, except for a few cases, optimal mechanisms are complex, highly dependent on the details of the setting, and impractical. Dr. Hartline addresses each these critiques in detail, and his project includes a well connected research agenda for developing a theory of mechanism design that is relevant to computer systems.This project will develop a theory for the design of mechanisms that are universal, simple, and practical. Mechanisms for computer systems must be universal -- indeed the success of the Internet is owed in part to the fact that most Internet protocols function under a wide range of workloads. Mechanisms for the Internet must be simple, if they are parameterized by more than a few dimensions, they are too difficult to optimize. Note in contrast that the classical economic theory gives complicated mechanisms that are inextricably dependent on the the setting. Finally, mechanisms for the Internet must be practical; this project addresses the disconnect between theory and practice in the computer science literature on mechanism design.
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AF: Small: Mechanism Design for the Classroom
  • 批准号:
    2229162
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $60.0万
  • 财政年份:
    2022
  • 负责人:
    Jason Hartline
  • 依托单位:
HDR TRIPODS: Collaborative Research: Institute for Data, Econometrics, Algorithms and Learning
  • 批准号:
    1934931
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $83.38万
  • 财政年份:
    2019
  • 负责人:
    Jason Hartline
  • 依托单位:
AitF: Mechanism Design and Machine Learning for Peer Grading
  • 批准号:
    1733860
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $70.0万
  • 财政年份:
    2017
  • 负责人:
    Jason Hartline
  • 依托单位:
AF: Small: Non-revelation Mechanism Design
  • 批准号:
    1618502
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $45.0万
  • 财政年份:
    2016
  • 负责人:
    Jason Hartline
  • 依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
激发态氢气分子(e,2e)反应三重微分截面的高阶波恩近似和two-step mechanism修正
  • 批准号:
    11104247
  • 项目类别:
    青年科学基金项目
  • 资助金额:
    25.0万元
  • 批准年份:
    2011
  • 负责人:
    杨则金
  • 依托单位:
Research on the Rapid Growth Mechanism of KDP Crystal
  • 批准号:
    10774081
  • 项目类别:
    面上项目
  • 资助金额:
    45.0万元
  • 批准年份:
    2007
  • 负责人:
    滕冰
  • 依托单位: