Experimental Investigations of Infinitely Repeated Games

在各种各样的社会环境中，人们在相同的战略环境中反复互动。例如，企业在竞争中反复博弈，国家在国际舞台上反复互动，工人和员工在工作场所反复互动。这些重复的游戏已经被博弈论者分析过，他们发展了一系列广泛的预测。这个项目使用实验室实验来回答一系列问题，即这些理论如何很好地预测受控战略环境中的实际行为。第一组实验考察了如何通过观察特定参与者的决策来推断策略。第二组考察了重新协商证明在均衡选择中的作用。第三组实验测试了当受试者同时在多个领域互动时，他们支持合作结果的能力。最后一个项目测试了一个广为流传的断言，即参与者在无限次重复的折扣博弈和随机终止的博弈中玩的方式是一样的。该项目本质上是跨学科的，因为通过实验测试的博弈论方法和想法广泛应用于经济学、政治学、管理学、心理学和社会学。PI将把这项研究工作整合到研究生和本科生的课堂上。

A large variety of social settings involve people repeatedly interacting with each other in the same strategic situation.. For example, firms play repeated games when competing, nations repeatedly interact on the international stage, and workers and employees repeatedly interact in the workplace. These repeated games have been analyzed by game theorists, who have developed a broad range of predictions. This project uses laboratory experiments to answer a series of questions about how well those theories predict actual behavior in controlled strategic settings.The first set of experiments examine how to infer strategies by observing decisions made by a specific participant. The second set investigates the role of renegotiation proofness in equilibrium selection. The third group of experiments test the ability of subjects to support cooperative outcomes when they interact in multiple domains at the same time. The last project tests a widely made assertion that participants play the same way in infinitely repeated games with discounting and in randomly terminated games.The project is intrinsically interdisciplinary, because the game theory methods and ideas being tested with the experiments are widely used in economics, political science, management, psychology, and sociology. The PI will be integrating this research effort into both graduate and undergraduate classes.