Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Self Confidence in a Principal Agent Relationship

经济学博士论文研究：委托代理关系中的自信

• 批准号: 0849465
• 负责人: Guillaume Frechette
• 金额: $ 1.15万
• 依托单位: New York University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-02-15 至 2010-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0849465&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Economics; Self

In a perfect market, employers will offer wage and bonus packages that will provide employees with just the right incentives to accomplish tasks they are given. But what if, as has been widely documented, employees are systematically over or under-confident regarding their abilities? If so, employers might be able to take advantage of these biases. For example, employers could offer overconfident employees low wages and very high bonuses tied to outstanding performance. Overconfident employees will accept the low wages because they assume (incorrectly) that they are very likely to get the big bonuses.To test such predictions, the PIs will conduct an experiment in which participants are first assessed in terms of their self-confidence by comparing each participant's score on an aptitude test to the score the each participant predicted he or she would get. Subjects then participate in a simulated employment situation in a computer laboratory. The effect of over- or under-confidence is measured by comparing behavior when participants' probability of success in their task is determined by their test score, and when it depends on a randomly assigned number. This setup holds everything but the employee's self-assessed ability constant. The experiment will confirm if different self-confidence levels are indeed associated with different incentives, effort levels, and overall profits for employers and employees. Ultimately, it will set the stage for exploring the connection between self-confidence and demographic factors like gender and the implications of gender differences for the structure of work contracts.

在一个完美的市场中，雇主会提供工资和奖金，为员工提供适当的激励，以完成他们被赋予的任务。 但是，如果正如广泛记录的那样，员工对自己的能力系统性地过度自信或自信不足，那该怎么办？如果是这样的话，雇主们也许可以利用这些偏见。例如，雇主可以给过于自信的员工提供低工资和与出色表现挂钩的高额奖金。过于自信的员工会接受低工资，因为他们（错误地）认为自己很可能得到高额奖金。为了验证这种预测，PI将进行一项实验，首先通过比较每个参与者在能力倾向测试中的得分与每个参与者预测的得分来评估参与者的自信心。 然后，受试者在计算机实验室参加模拟就业情况。 过度自信或信心不足的影响是通过比较参与者的行为来衡量的，当参与者的成功概率由他们的测试分数决定时，以及当它取决于随机分配的数字时。这种设置保持了除了员工自我评估能力之外的所有内容。该实验将证实，不同的自信水平是否确实与雇主和雇员的不同激励、努力水平和总体利润有关。最终，它将为探索自信与性别等人口因素之间的联系以及性别差异对工作合同结构的影响奠定基础。