Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Self Confidence in a Principal Agent Relationship

经济学博士论文研究：委托代理关系中的自信

• 批准号: 0849465
• 负责人: Guillaume Frechette
• 金额: $ 1.15万
• 依托单位: New York University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-02-15 至 2010-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0849465&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Economics; Self

In a perfect market, employers will offer wage and bonus packages that will provide employees with just the right incentives to accomplish tasks they are given. But what if, as has been widely documented, employees are systematically over or under-confident regarding their abilities? If so, employers might be able to take advantage of these biases. For example, employers could offer overconfident employees low wages and very high bonuses tied to outstanding performance. Overconfident employees will accept the low wages because they assume (incorrectly) that they are very likely to get the big bonuses.To test such predictions, the PIs will conduct an experiment in which participants are first assessed in terms of their self-confidence by comparing each participant's score on an aptitude test to the score the each participant predicted he or she would get. Subjects then participate in a simulated employment situation in a computer laboratory. The effect of over- or under-confidence is measured by comparing behavior when participants' probability of success in their task is determined by their test score, and when it depends on a randomly assigned number. This setup holds everything but the employee's self-assessed ability constant. The experiment will confirm if different self-confidence levels are indeed associated with different incentives, effort levels, and overall profits for employers and employees. Ultimately, it will set the stage for exploring the connection between self-confidence and demographic factors like gender and the implications of gender differences for the structure of work contracts.

在一个理想的市场中，雇主将提供工资和奖金套餐，这将为雇员提供恰到好处的激励措施来完成他们的任务。 但是，如果正如已广泛记录的那样，员工对自己的能力有系统地超越或不自信该怎么办？如果是这样，雇主也许可以利用这些偏见。例如，雇主可以提供过度自信的雇员低工资和与出色绩效相关的非常高的奖金。过分自信的员工将接受低工资，因为他们认为（错误地）他们很可能会获得巨大的奖金。要测试此类预测，PIS将进行一个实验，在该实验中，通过将每个参与者的分数比较每个参与者的得分与每个参与者的分数，首先对参与者的自信心进行评估。 然后，受试者参加了计算机实验室的模拟就业状况。 当参与者在任务中成功的概率由他们的测试评分确定，以及依赖于随机分配的数字时，通过比较行为来衡量过度或不信任的效果。除了员工的自我评估能力恒定外，这种设置还拥有一切。该实验将确认不同的自信水平是否确实与雇主和雇员的不同激励措施，努力水平和整体利润相关联。最终，它将为探索自信与人口统计学因素（例如性别以及性别差异对工作合同结构的含义）之间的联系奠定阶段。