Collaborative Research: Theory, Experiments and Empirical Methodology of Coalition Bargaining: An integrated Approach

合作研究：联盟谈判的理论、实验和实证方法：一种综合方法

• 批准号: 0519045
• 负责人: Guillaume Frechette
• 金额: $ 15.82万
• 依托单位: New York University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2005
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2005-07-15 至 2009-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0519045&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Theory; Experiments; Empirical

This project will work to integrate the existing theoretical, experimental and empirical work on coalitional bargaining. The PIs plan to create a methodological and substantive interaction between experimental and empirical work on bargaining behavior. They also want to extend theoretical, experimental, and empirical work on legislative bargaining to a broader range of policy issues. Previous work in this area has focued primarily on distributive situations in which individuals or groups argue over the division of a fixed amount of a good or resourse. Clearly, in the real world legislative and corporate committees bargain over non-distributional issues at least as much as they bargain over the division of a fixed amount of transferable resources. Moreover, group decision making processes involve variousdegrees of interaction between bargaining rules and voting rules, and hence both theories and experiments analyzing group decision making should reflect this interplay of institutions.This project aims to make a number of steps in these directions. The PIs will develop new theories and use laboratory experiments to test those theories with American students participants as well as Canadian legislators. Among the questions of interest are concerns about the causes and consequences of issue-by-issue bargaining versus simultaneous bargaining. A second important question is whether different bargaining rules will have different efficiency consequences. Finally, they will consider the effects of both bargaining and voting rules on the relative likelihood of public good provision versus pork barrel projects.The project is intrinsically interdisciplinary, since bargaining is important in any disciplineinterested in group decision making. For example, in American politics there is an enormous literature on committee structures, party loyalty, public good provisions versus distributive politics, log-rolling, and multi-dimensional negotiations among players with heterogeneous interests. The research results of the present project have the potential to result in substantial changes in how we look at analyze all of these topics. 1

该项目将致力于整合有关联盟谈判的现有理论，实验和经验工作。 PIS计划在谈判行为的实验和经验工作之间建立方法论和实质性的相互作用。 他们还想将有关立法谈判的理论，实验性和实证工作扩展到更广泛的政策问题。 该领域的先前工作主要集中在分配情况下，个人或群体就固定数量或资源的划分进行了争论。 显然，在现实世界中，关于非分布问题的立法和公司委员会在固定数量的可转让资源的分配方面至少讨价还价。此外，小组决策过程涉及谈判规则和投票规则之间的各种互动度，因此，分析小组决策的理论和实验都应反映出机构的这种相互作用。此项目旨在在这些方向上做出许多步骤。 PI将开发新的理论，并使用实验室实验与美国学生参与者以及加拿大立法者一起测试这些理论。 感兴趣的问题之一是人们对逐个问题的原因和后果的担忧与同时讨价还价的问题。第二个重要的问题是不同的谈判规则是否会产生不同的效率后果。最后，他们将考虑谈判和投票规则对公共商品提供与猪肉桶项目相对可能性的影响。该项目本质上是跨学科的，因为讨价还价在小组决策中涉及的任何学科都很重要。 例如，在美国政治中，有关于委员会结构，党派忠诚度，公共善意与分配政治，登录和多维谈判的大量文献。本项目的研究结果有可能导致我们看待分析所有这些主题的方式发生重大变化。 1