Collaborative Research: Simulating the Dynamics of Insurgency

历史证据表明，一旦叛乱形成，解决它们可能需要几年时间，往往是相当血腥的，可能不是决定性的（许多叛乱复发）。 在许多情况下，开展长期反叛乱运动的成本对政府来说是非常昂贵的，而只能取得微不足道的成功。 另一方面，虽然我们经常关注长期和血腥的叛乱，但历史也表明，大多数新生的叛乱实际上很快就会失败。 该项目开发了一系列基于代理的计算机模拟模型，以帮助理解与击败叛乱和确定哪些可能会拖延，哪些将很快被击败相关的一些复杂性。 特别是，这些模型将帮助我们解决三个问题。 第一，是什么导致一些叛乱组织建立得很好，而且不会崩溃，而另一些叛乱组织则很快失败？ 第二，尽管有政府的镇压，叛乱什么时候才能达到可能生存的程度？ 最后，政府如何有效地调整其反叛乱战略，以遏制叛乱的增长？ 该模拟模拟了叛乱的早期阶段，其中平民，叛乱分子和士兵（政府军）的相互作用至关重要。 在叛乱的早期阶段，平民是叛乱分子与士兵互动的受众，他们可以加入叛乱，也可以被阻止加入叛乱。叛乱分子可以袭击政府目标，反过来又会被袭击、俘虏或杀害，他们的行动为平民改变忠诚创造了条件。 初步模拟显示，政府/士兵在试图抓获叛乱分子时，准确性至关重要，因为政府对叛乱分子的军事行动有时会适得其反。 一系列扩展的初始模拟模型的开发，重点是叛乱和政府招募，学习，以及多个叛乱团体的相互作用。 模拟模型的开发与统计分析相结合，以确定模拟中观察到的模式是否也存在于国际政治中。 该项目研究了叛乱人口，并观察模型所建议的因素是否会预测叛乱模式。 特别是，叛乱的持续时间，叛乱增长的速度，以及叛乱渗透到当地人口的范围进行了审查。 沿着各种代理测度模型的构建？为了更好地理解这些概念，该项目收集了关于叛乱和反叛乱努力的新数据，以便能够更好地检验模拟中出现的假设。 该建议的更广泛影响包括从模拟和经验分析中揭示了叛乱持续时间和结束的重要模式，并证实了这些模式的存在以及国际体系中变量之间的关系。 特别是，了解不同类型的政府行动在何种情况下可能有用或产生反作用，可以提供有经验支持的具体政策建议。 了解这些模式和关系可能有助于设计适当的战略，以对付现有的叛乱，并首先避免其出现。

Historical evidence suggests that once insurgencies become well-established, resolving them can take several years, is often quite bloody, and may not be definitive (many insurgencies recur). In many cases, the cost of conducting a prolonged counter-insurgency campaign is very costly for governments while producing only marginal success. On the other hand, while we often focus on long and bloody insurgencies, history also demonstrates that most nascent insurgencies actually fail quickly. This project develops a series of agent-based computer simulation models to aid in understand some of the complexities associated with defeating insurgencies and determining which are likely to drag on, and which will be defeated quickly. In particular, these models will help us address three questions. First, what leads some insurgencies to become well established and resistant to collapse, while others fail quickly? Second, when do insurgencies reach the point where they are likely to survive, despite government repression? Finally, how can governments effectively adapt their counter-insurgency strategies to stem the growth of insurgency? The simulation models the early stages of insurgency where the interactions of civilians, insurgents, and soldiers (government forces) are critical. At early stages of insurgency, civilians constitute an audience for insurgent-soldier interactions, and can join the insurgency or be deterred from joining it. Actions by insurgents who can attack government targets, and in turn be attacked and captured or killed, set the stage for civilians to change loyalties. Initial simulations have revealed the critical importance of accuracy on the part of governments/soldiers who seek to capture insurgents, since government military actions against insurgents sometimes backfire. A series of extensions to the initial simulation model are developed, focusing on insurgent and government recruitment, learning, and the interactions of multiple insurgent groups. The development of the simulation models is coupled with statistical analysis to determine whether the patterns observed in the simulations are also present in international politics. The project examines a population of insurgencies and sees whether factors that the model suggests will predict patterns of insurgencies in fact do so. In particular, insurgency duration, the speed at which insurgency grows, and the scope of penetration of the insurgency into the local population are examined. Along with construction of various proxy measures of the models? concepts, the project incorporates the collection of new data about insurgencies and counter-insurgency efforts to be able to better test the hypotheses that emerge from the simulations. The broader impacts of the proposal include the revelation of important patterns of duration and termination of insurgency, both from the simulation and empirical analysis, and confirming the presence of these patterns and relationships between variables in the international system. In particular, understanding the circumstances under which different types of government actions may be useful or counterproductive may offer specific policy advice, with empirical backing. Understanding these patterns and relationships may help in the design of appropriate strategies for confronting existing insurgencies and avoiding their emergence in the first place.