AF: Small: Auction Design in Constrained Settings

PI将考虑拍卖设计的两个方面，这两个方面不仅具有根本重要性，而且尽管在经济学文献中进行了广泛的研究，但也无视显著的积极结果。这些方面源于对拍卖施加的实际限制：对投标人的预算限制，以及投标人和拍卖人之间的信息不对称和不完全。PI寻求开发和使用理论计算机科学中的技术，特别是近似算法、对抗性机制设计、随机控制和学习理论，以开发新的工具和技术来解决这些问题。拟议研究的智力价值将是在理论计算机科学、经济学、随机决策理论和计算学习中对相关问题的混合、包容和延伸工作，从而开发新的理论模型和解决方案，这反过来将影响相应的学科。此外，开发这些工具势在必行，因为我们考虑的方面将成为在几个现代基于互联网的环境中成功部署拍卖的关键。拟议的工作还将通过讲习班和专门课程广泛传播。

The PI will consider two facets of auction design that are not only of fundamental importance, but also have defied significant positive results despite extensive research in the economics literature. These facets arise from practical constraints imposed on auctions: Budget constraints on the bidders, and asymmetric and incomplete information between the bidder and auctioneer. The PI seeks to develop and employ techniques from theoretical computer science, particularly approximation algorithms, adversarial mechanism design, stochastic control, and learning theory to develop novel tools and techniques to address these questions. The intellectual merit of the proposed research will be in blending, encompassing, and extending work on related problems in theoretical computer science, economics, stochastic decision theory, and computational learning, thereby developing new theoretical models and solutions, which in turn will impact the respective disciplines. Furthermore, it is imperative to develop such tools since the facets we consider will become critical to the successful deployment of auctions in several modern internet-based settings. The proposed work will also be broadly disseminated via workshops and specialized courses.