Doctoral Dissertation Research: The File Drawer Problem

科学进步依赖于科学家之间以及从科学家到公众的畅通无阻的信息共享。然而，科学问题的定义通常是模棱两可的，涉及不正当的制度激励，并促进科学家之间的竞争，以便在其他人之前得出结论。作为这些功能的结果，意外和不想要的结果很常见，并且可能不总是被报告。如果信息不共享，科学家可能更有可能重复彼此的错误，得出错误的结论，并对自己的结论过于自信。本文采用分析和实验相结合的方法，考察共享信息决策背后的推理过程、共享信息的有用性以及未能正确共享信息的社会成本。这些问题的可能解决方案将在现场试验中进行测试。六个试验将在模拟的科学环境中使用非专业参与者，以检验后见之明、制度激励、模棱两可和竞争对他们关于共享信息的科学推理和决策的影响。在前两个实验中，非专业参与者将得到实验的描述和结果，并必须评估研究的质量和是否应该报告结果。一些参与者将被要求前瞻性地评估结果，而另一些参与者将被要求在事后评估结果。我们假设，参与者会得出结论，假设实验是错误的，当他们不证实参与者时，不应该报告？先入为主的信念，这种趋势在事后会比在预见中更糟糕。在第二组实验中，参与者将解决科学家通常面临的三个挑战：不正当的激励、模棱两可和竞争。当得出结论可以带来经济回报时，参与者很可能会将不确定的证据解释为错误，并决定不报告这一证据。模棱两可和竞争可能会加剧这种激励的反常效果。在最后一个实验中，前三项研究的参与者的试验历史将与一名新参与者分享，该参与者将试图解决相同的规则。有了这些实验，就有可能检验有偏见的信息共享的理由和潜在的社会成本。

Scientific progress depends on unimpeded information sharing between scientists, and from scientists to the public. Scientific problems, however, are typically ambiguously defined, involve perverse institutional incentives, and promote competition between scientists to come to conclusions before others. As a result of these features, unexpected and unwanted results are common and may not always be reported. If information is not shared, scientists may be more likely to repeat one another's mistakes, reach false conclusions, and be overconfident in their conclusions. This dissertation combines analysis and experimentation to examine the reasoning processes underlying decisions to share information, the usefulness of information shared, and the social costs of failure to properly share information. Possible solutions to these problems will be tested in a field trial.Six experiments will use lay participants in simulated science environments to examine the effects of hindsight, institutional incentives, ambiguity, and competition on their scientific reasoning and decisions about sharing information. In the first two experiments, lay participants will be given descriptions and results of experiments and must evaluate the quality of the research and whether the results should be reported. Some participants will be asked to evaluate the results in foresight, whereas others will be asked to evaluate the results in hindsight. We hypothesize that participants will conclude that hypothetical experiments are in error and should not be reported when they disconfirm the participants? prior beliefs, and that this tendency will be worse in hindsight than in foresight. In a second set of experiments, participants will address three challenges that scientists commonly face: perverse incentives, ambiguity, and competition. When reaching a conclusion can lead to a financial payoff, it is likely that participants will interpret disconfirming evidence as error and decide not to report this evidence. Ambiguity and competition are likely to enhance this perverse effect of incentives. In a final experiment, the trial history of participants from these first three studies will be shared with a new participant who will try to solve the same rule. With these experiments it is possible to examine the reasoning and potential social cost of biased information sharing.