ICES: Small: Institutions for Cooperation in Large Economies of Strangers

发达经济体在很大程度上基于非个人的交换;贸易不需要关于他人过去行为的高水平信息。因此，缺乏信任、社会距离、不履行承诺的可能性以及其他贸易摩擦都阻碍了经济活动。该项目采用理论和实验方法来研究经济体中的个人和群体行为，这些经济体中的个人彼此不认识，也可能不信任。这些陌生人成对地与随机变化的对手互动，对手的身份和过去的行为是未知的。在每一次交易中，个人可以合作，也可以投机取巧。相遇的顺序是不确定的，所以可能有很多结果。从理论上讲，自我关注的个人可以克服机会主义的诱惑，并取得最好的结果，通过采用社区为基础的惩罚计划。该研究将基于这些无限期重复的匹配游戏对小型和大型实验室经济进行系统研究。它将通过识别与可能既不了解也不信任彼此的个人之间的合作的出现，可持续性和崩溃相关的行为要素和内生机构来推进社会和经济科学的知识。关于合作的新见解将应用于社会决策问题的研究是一个活跃的研究领域的学科，如政治学，会计学和社会学。

Developed economies are largely based on impersonal exchange; trade does not require high levels of information about others' past behavior. Consequently, lack of trust, social distance, the possibility to break promises and other trade frictions all hinder economic activity. This project employs theoretical and experimental methodologies to study individual and group behavior in economies populated by individuals who do not know each other and may not trust each other. These strangers interact in pairs with randomly changing opponents whose identities and past behaviors are unknown. In each trade encounter, individuals can either cooperate or behave opportunistically. The sequence of encounters is indefinite, so many outcomes are possible. Theoretically, self-regarding individuals can overcome opportunistic temptations, and attain the best outcome, by adopting community-based punishment schemes. The research will pursue a systematic study of small and large laboratory economies based on these indefinitely repeated matching games. It will advance knowledge in the social and economic sciences by identifying behavioral elements and endogenously-arising institutions that are associated to the emergence, sustainability, and breakdown of cooperation among individuals who may neither know nor trust each other. New insights about cooperation will have applications to disciplines in which the study of social decision problems is an active area of research, such as political science, accounting, and sociology.