Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Bargaining Models

讨价还价理论在过去的三十年里蓬勃发展。最初的两个参与者之间的讨价还价模型，他们交替提出报价和还价，已经在许多方向上扩展，允许更一般的谈判协议和两个以上的参与者。理论文献的发展与讨价还价模型的广泛应用齐头并进，并且在很大程度上受到其推动。这些包括劳动、家庭、法律的、住房、政治、国际和医疗谈判。关于谈判结果以及谈判过程细节的数据越来越多，这也刺激了实证研究的激增，在这些研究中，偶然性谈判主义逐渐导致了将战略谈判模型应用于数据的更系统的尝试。在理论和实证应用中得到广泛研究的两个谈判框架是随机序列谈判模型，和不寻常的前科讨价还价在随机序贯谈判模型中，允许分配的剩余（或“蛋糕”）和谈判协议（即参与者可以提出报价和还价的顺序）根据随机过程随时间推移而演变。这一特性使得模型具有灵活性（它为一大类讨价还价博弈提供了一个统一的框架）。它还为实际谈判中经常出现的拖延达成协议的情况找了理由。随机谈判框架已被用于各种实证应用，从议会民主制中联合政府的形成，到集体谈判协议，到公司破产重组，到产品市场行业标准的制定，以及主权债务重新谈判。具有不寻常先验的谈判模型也合理化了达成协议的延迟，并代表了理论和应用研究的快速增长领域。在这些模型中，参与者对未能达成协议的后果有不同的预期，这在几种讨价还价的情况下是一种合理的情况。例如，具有不常见先验的讨价还价模型已被用于研究医疗事故诉讼中的争议解决过程或公司签署广泛交叉许可协议的激励以及半导体行业中广泛交叉许可谈判的持续时间。尽管讨价还价模型在经济应用中的重要性，关于这些模型的结构要素或反事实环境中的讨价还价结果是否可以在不强加参数假设的情况下被识别和估计，人们知之甚少。拟议的研究将通过在参与者厌恶风险且具有异质折扣因子的随机谈判模型以及参与者具有不寻常折扣因子的谈判模型的非参数识别和估计中提供积极的结果，为谈判模型估计的文献做出贡献。先验。本研究的统一主题是，这两类模型可以解释延迟达成协议的发生，并在经验上是相关的，因为在许多应用中，风险规避，时间偏好的贴现率的异质性，以及过度乐观可能会在确定谈判协议的时间和条款中发挥重要作用。

Bargaining theory has flourished in the past thirty years. The original model of bargaining between two players who alternate in making offers and counteroffers has been extended in a number of directions allowing for more general negotiation protocols and more than two players. The development of the theoretical literature has gone hand in hand with, and for a large part has been motivated by, the broad range of applications of bargaining models. These include labor, family, legal, housing, political, international and medical negotiations. The increased availability of data on the outcomes of such negotiations, as well as on the details of the bargaining process, has also stimulated a surge in empirical work, where casual empiricism has progressively led the way to more systematic attempts to take strategic bargaining models to data.Two bargaining frameworks that have been extensively studied in theoretical and empirical applications are the stochastic sequential bargaining model, and bargaining with uncommon priors. In the model of stochastic sequential bargaining, the surplus to be allocated (or the "cake") and the bargaining protocol (i.e. the order in which players can make offers and counteroffers), are allowed to evolve over time according to a stochastic process. This feature makes the model flexible (it provides a unified framework for a large class of bargaining games). It also rationalizes the occurrence of delays in reaching an agreement, which are often observed in actual negotiations. The stochastic bargaining framework has been used in a variety of empirical applications that range from the formation of coalition governments in parliamentary democracy, to collective bargaining agreements, to corporate bankruptcy reorganizations, to the setting of industry standards in product markets, and to sovereign debt renegotiations.Models of bargaining with uncommon priors also rationalize the occurrence of delays in reaching an agreement, and represent a fast-growing area of both theoretical and applied research. In these models, players have different expectations regarding the consequences of failing to reach an agreement, which is a plausible scenario in several bargaining situations. For example, bargaining models with uncommon priors have been used to study the process of dispute resolution in medical malpractice litigation or the incentives of firms to sign broad cross-license agreements as well as the duration of broad cross-license negotiations in the semiconductor industry.In spite of the importance of bargaining models in economic applications, little is known about whether the structural elements of these models or the bargaining outcomes in counterfactual environments can be identified and estimated without imposing parametric assumptions. The proposed research will contribute to the literature on the estimation of bargaining models by providing positive results in the nonparametric identification and estimation of stochastic bargaining models where players are risk-averse and have heterogeneous discount factors, and of bargaining models where players have uncommon priors. The unifying theme of this research is that both classes of models may explain the occurrence of delays in reaching an agreement and are relevant empirically, as in many applications risk aversion, heterogeneity in the discount rate of time preference, and excessive optimism are likely to play an important role in determining the timing and terms of negotiation agreements.