FOundations of Secure and TrustEd HardwaRe (FOSTER) Workshop
FOundations of Secure and TrustEd HardwaRe (FOSTER) Workshop
批准号:
1749175
负责人:
Siddharth Garg
金额:
$4.5万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2017
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2017-09-01 至 2018-08-31
中文摘要
半导体微芯片是我们社会中所有电子设备的大脑。为了控制成本,微芯片通常在海外设计甚至制造。外包半导体微芯片的设计和制造是以牺牲其安全性为代价的。首先,一个离岸的微芯片代工厂可以复制或窃取芯片的蓝图,并在黑市上出售芯片的副本。也许更糟糕的是,代工厂还可以以隐秘的方式修改芯片的蓝图,这样修改就不会被发现,芯片就会以有害的方式运行。这些漏洞影响了美国商业芯片设计公司的利润,但也许更关键的是,威胁到国防设备和关键基础设施中使用的电子元件的完整性。十多年来,学术界和行业界对解决方案进行了卓有成效的研究,以应对电子元件设计、制造和供应面临的这些威胁。然而,在至关重要的问题上仍然没有达成共识。例如,在近期和远期,最有害的攻击媒介是什么?而且,我们如何定量地比较不同的防御机制提供的安全性?现在时机已经成熟,可以将来自政府、行业和学术界的专家聚集在一起,为下一阶段的硬件安全研究奠定基础,并就最关键的挑战达成广泛共识,确定有前途的防御机制,建立评估解决方案的方法。 FOSTER研讨会旨在应对这一挑战。研讨会的形式将鼓励关键利益相关者之间进行深入和开放的讨论,其结果将是一份全面的报告,为研究和将研究成果转化为实践制定了路线图。IC设计流程的全球化降低了设计复杂性和制造成本,但也引入了一些安全漏洞。IC供应链中任何地方的流氓代理都可以执行以下攻击:逆向工程、硬件特洛伊木马插入、伪造(特别是回收的IC)和IP盗版。这些攻击每年使半导体行业损失数十亿美元,破坏国家安全,并使关键基础设施处于危险之中。尽管这一问题的严重性,目前的商业IC设计工具,在大多数情况下,不认为安全性作为一个一流的设计指标。十多年的硬件安全研究有助于识别和分析该领域的关键问题,并提出各种解决方案来应对不同的攻击面。随着硬件安全研究进入一个新的成熟阶段,迫切需要将多个研究线程综合成一个协同的安全感知EDA工具流程,以实现下一代可信硬件平台。FOSTER研讨会旨在满足这一需求。研讨会将汇集来自行业和学术界的领先专家,讨论以下基本主题:(1)描述硬件安全攻击面;(2)确定正式的定量指标,以评估和基准安全解决方案;(3)确定最有前途的防御机制,并了解不同的解决方案如何协同工作。研讨会的成果将引起EDA工具开发商、无晶圆厂半导体设计公司、硅代工厂、测试公司、嵌入式系统公司、计算机和通信安全公司以及美国政府机构的兴趣,最终将使医疗保健、国防、金融、运输和汽车应用领域的可靠电子产品受益。
英文摘要
Semiconductor microchips are the brains inside all of the electronic devices that pervade our society. To control costs, microchips are often designed and even manufactured off-shore. Outsourcing the design and fabrication of semiconductor microchips comes at the expense of their security. For one, an off-shore microchip foundry can copy or steal the chip's blueprint, and sell copies of the chip in the black market. Perhaps worse, the foundry can also modify the chip's blueprint in stealthy ways, such that modifications go undetected and the chip misbehaves in harmful ways. The vulnerabilities affect the bottom-lines of commercial U.S. chip design companies, but perhaps more critically, threaten the integrity of electronic components used in defense equipment and critical infrastructure. There has been more than a decade of fruitful academic and industry research on solutions to counteract these threats to the design, manufacturing, and supply of electronic components. However, there is still no common consensus on questions of critical importance. For instance, what are the most pernicious attack vectors, in the near and far term? And, how can we quantitatively compare different defense mechanisms in terms of the security they offer? The time is ripe to bring together experts from government, industry and academia to lay the foundations for the next phase of hardware security research and reach a broad consensus on the most critical challenges, identify promising defense mechanisms and establish methodologies to evaluate solutions. The FOSTER Workshop is aimed at meeting this challenge. The format of the workshop will encourage deep and open discussion between key stakeholders, and its outcome will be a comprehensive report that lays out a roadmap for research and transitioning research outcomes to practice.Globalization of the IC design flow has reduced design complexity and fabrication cost, but has introduced several security vulnerabilities. A rogue agent anywhere in the IC supply chain can perform the following attacks: reverse engineering, hardware Trojans insertion, counterfeiting (specifically, recycled ICs), and IP piracy. These attacks cost the semiconductor industry billions of dollars annually, undermine national security and put critical infrastructure in danger. Despite the severity of this problem, current commercial IC design tools, for the most part, do not consider security as a first-class design metric. More than a decade of hardware security research has been instrumental in identifying and analyzing the key problems in this area and proposing a diverse array of solutions that address different attack surfaces. As hardware security research moves to a new phase of maturity, there is an urgent need to synthesize multiple threads of research into a synergistic security-aware EDA tool-flow that will enable the next generation of trusted hardware platforms.The FOSTER Workshop aims to address this need. The workshop will bring together leading experts from industry and academia to address the following foundational topics: (1) characterizing the hardware security attack surface; (2) identifying formal, quantitative metrics to evaluate and benchmark security solutions; (3) identifying the most promising defense mechanisms and understand how different solutions can work synergistically. The outcomes of the workshop will be of interest to EDA tool developers, fabless semiconductor design companies, silicon foundries, test companies, embedded system companies, computer and communication security companies, and US government agencies, and will eventually benefit trustworthy electronics for healthcare, defense, finance, transportation, and automotive applications.
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