STARSS: Small: New Attack Vectors and Formal Security Analysis for Integrated Circuit Logic Obfuscation

STARSS：小型：集成电路逻辑混淆的新攻击向量和形式安全分析

• 批准号: 1527072
• 负责人: Siddharth Garg
• 金额: $ 32.11万
• 依托单位: New York University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2015
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2015-09-01 至 2019-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1527072&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: STARSS; Small; New; Attack; Vectors

Reverse engineering of integrated circuits (ICs) has become a major concern for semiconductor design companies since services to depackage, delayer and image an IC can be used to extract the underlying design. IP theft of this nature has not only economic impact due to IP theft, but also compromises the security of ICs used in military and critical infrastructure. The goal of this project is to gain a deeper understanding of the capabilities of an attacker who is trying to reverse engineer ICs that use current methods to camouflage their design, and develops stronger camouflaging techniques in light of these new attacks. This project explores foundational analysis of the security of logic obfuscation using camouflaging. The project develops a fundamental security metric for logic obfuscation, D-security, that measures the minimum number of input patterns an attacker needs to know to decamouflage a circuit. This research devises strong and effective decamouflaging attacks in order to understand the vulnerabilities in existing approaches, and new fortified IC camouflaging mechanisms that are resilient to these attacks. This work addresses the economic and security concerns result from IC reverse engineering, and will be integrated in graduate and undergraduate coursework at NYU as well as in the Embedded Systems Challenge (ESC) at NYU's annual cyber-security awareness week.

集成电路（ICS）的逆向工程已成为半导体设计公司的主要关注点，因为服务于DepAckage，延迟器和图像，可以使用IC来提取基础设计。 IP盗窃这种性质不仅由于IP盗窃而产生了经济影响，而且损害了军事和关键基础设施中使用的IC的安全性。该项目的目的是更深入地了解攻击者的能力，后者试图反向使用当前方法伪装其设计的工程师，并根据这些新攻击来开发更强大的伪装技术。 该项目探讨了使用伪装对逻辑混淆的安全性的基础分析。该项目开发了用于逻辑混淆的基本安全指标，D-Security，该指标衡量了攻击者需要知道的最小输入模式数量才能使电路变形。这项研究设计了强烈而有效的de虫攻击，以了解现有方法中的脆弱性，以及对这些攻击有弹性的新的强化IC伪装机制。这项工作解决了IC反向工程引起的经济和安全问题，并将集成在纽约大学的研究生和本科课程中，以及在纽约大学年度网络安全认识周的嵌入式系统挑战（ESC）中。