NSF-BSF: Collaborative Research: Market Conduct in Technology Adoption in the Automobile Industry

摘要尽管反垄断法涵盖了更多的合谋方式，但反垄断执法研究主要集中在价格和数量合谋上。该项目将探讨汽车制造商在采用排放控制技术方面串通的原因和福利后果。 该项目的重点是汽车制造商，这些汽车制造商被指控串通采用柴油机尾气处理液（DEF）罐，这些罐太小，无法有效清除氮氧化物（NOx），这是空气污染的主要原因。 该项目将调查汽车制造商涉嫌串通如何掩盖违反氮氧化物排放法规的行为。该项目将量化涉嫌串通对氮氧化物污染损害、汽车买家盈余和公司利润的影响。 这些影响告知反垄断处罚的适当数额，以弥补这种冲突的福利损害。 最后，该项目将研究环境和反垄断监管是否以及如何减轻技术合谋造成的效率低下。该项目将建立和评估消费者汽车需求和汽车制造商技术选择的结构模型，并模拟反事实政策。该项目利用了关于汽车价格、销售和特性的全面的新数据集。 所采用的结构模型的一个新特点是，一个公司的不遵守检测的概率取决于其他公司的行为，以及自己的。 更分散的选择分布可能会导致监管机构质疑为什么一些公司需要使用大型DEF罐，而其他公司显然需要使用小型罐。 通过在小型油箱上进行协调，汽车制造商同时降低了被监管机构检测到的可能性，并使他们的车辆对汽车买家更具吸引力（因为油箱减少了货物空间，这是一个有价值的车辆功能）。 利用消费者口味和汽车制造商成本的模型和估计，该项目将进行反事实模拟，以探讨以下问题：（i）量化加强排放标准执行的好处;（ii）计算技术合谋与竞争性反事实相比的反竞争损害;（iii）确定最有利于技术合谋的需求和供应条件。该项目推进了经济学研究，并对企业勾结、反垄断执法和行业标准具有监管和政策意义。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

AbstractAntitrust enforcement research has mostly focused on price and quantity collusion, even though antitrust law encompasses more ways to collude. This project will explore the causes and welfare consequences of automakers colluding on the adoption of emission control technologies. The project focuses on automakers that have been alleged to have colluded on adopting Diesel Exhaust Fluid (DEF) tanks that were too small to effectively clean up nitrogen oxide (NOx), a major contributor to air pollution. The project will investigate how the alleged collusion by automakers concealed violation of NOx emissions regulation. The project will quantify the effects of the alleged collusion on NOx pollution damages, car buyer surplus, and firm profits. These effects inform the proper amount of antitrust penalties to remedy welfare damages of such collisions. Finally, the project will examine whether and how environmental and antitrust regulation can mitigate inefficiencies from technology collusion. The project will build and estimate a structural model of consumer vehicle demand and automaker technology choice, and simulate counterfactual policies. The project utilizes a comprehensive new data set on vehicle prices, sales, and characteristics. A novel feature of the employed structural model is that the probability of non-compliance detection for one firm depends on other firms' behavior as well as its own. A more dispersed distribution in choices may cause a regulator to question why some firms need to use large DEF tanks while others apparently manage with small tanks. By coordinating on small tanks, the automakers simultaneously reduce the probability of being detected by the regulator and make their vehicles more attractive to car buyers (as the tank reduces cargo space, a valuable vehicle feature). With the model and estimates of consumer tastes and automaker costs, the project will conduct counterfactual simulation to explore the following issues: (i) quantify the benefit of strengthening the enforcement of emission standards; (ii) calculate the anti-competitive damage of technology collusion compared to the competitive counterfactual; and (iii) identify the demand and supply conditions most conducive to technology collusion. The project advances the economics research and has regulatory and policy implications on firm collusion, antitrust enforcement, and industry standards.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.