Understanding the Effects of Government Procurement Methods on Prices: an Empirical Study of Inmate Telecommunications Services

该项目将收集数据并使用这些数据来测试政府采购如何影响服务价格的模型。研究小组将调查为什么囚犯支付的电信费用远远高于提供服务的成本。该项目将做出三个具体贡献。第一项是收集、整理和公布向囚犯收取的费用以及提供电信服务的私营公司与采购政府实体（例如，州一级的惩教部）之间谈判的合同的信息。第二是通过经济理论的视角来分析信息，以理解为什么利率被设定在一个高水平。可能导致费率上升的因素包括：付费意愿高、电信服务提供商之间的竞争有限以及提供商与采购实体之间的收入分成协议。最后，该项目将探讨由感兴趣的非营利组织提出的各种政策补救措施的功效。研究结果将有助于我们了解政府采购的具体规则对采购结果的影响。其结果可能是对如何改进采购方法以实现重要的社会目标（如整体经济效率和消费者公平）的新见解。本项目是对美国囚犯电信服务（ITS）的实证研究。众所周知，囚犯支付的费用非常高，ITS市场高度集中，采购政府实体通常通过谈判获得从囚犯身上获得的一部分收入。为了支持实证调查，将收集采购过程的数据，利用许多州的公共信息法，根据要求提供文件。采购的结构模型将基于Asker和Cantillon（2008）的二分拍卖框架开发，模型的参数将使用从数据请求中获得的数据进行估计或校准。通过反事实模拟，市场力量和收入分享协议对囚犯收费的贡献将被量化。此外，将探讨加强反垄断执法、收缩限制和费率监管的有效性。该奖项反映了美国国家科学基金会的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

The project will collect data and use the data to test a model of how government procurement can affect the price of a service. The research team will examine why the rates that inmates pay for telecommunications are much higher than the cost of providing the service. The project will make three specific contributions. The first is to collect, organize, and publish information about the rates charged to inmates and the contracts negotiated between the private companies providing telecommunications services and the procuring government entities (e.g., a state-level Department of Corrections). The second is to analyze the information through the lens of economic theory to understand why rates are set at a high level. Among the factors that may contribute to elevated rates are a high willingness-to-pay for calls, limited competition among the providers of telecommunications services, and revenue-sharing agreements between providers and the procuring entities. Finally, the project will explore the efficacy of various policy remedies that have been proposed by interested nonprofit organizations. The results will help us understand how the specific rules used for government procurement affect procurement outcomes. The result could be new insights into how to improve procurement methods to meet important societal goals such as overall economic efficiency and consumer fairness.The project is an empirical study of inmate telecommunications services (ITS) in the United States. It is widely known that inmates pay very high rates, that the market for ITS is highly concentrated, and that the procuring government entity typically negotiates to obtain a portion of the revenues obtained from inmates. To support empirical inquiry, data will be collected on the procurement process, taking advantage of public information laws that make documentation available upon request in many states. A structural model of procurement will be developed based on the second-score auction framework of Asker and Cantillon (2008), and the parameters of the model will be estimated or calibrated using the data obtained from the data requests. With counterfactual simulations, the contributions of market power and revenue-sharing agreements to the rates charged to inmates will be quantified. Further, the efficacy of enhanced antitrust enforcement, contraction restrictions, and rate regulation will be explored.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.