What's the use of emotions in classical pragmatism? A critical analysis of 'experience' and 'action' in the works of John Dewey and Charles S. Peirce (with an eye to clarifying normative aspects of human-animal relationships)

众所周知，古典哲学实用主义声称能够将哲学探究集中在所谓的现实问题上，并通过这样做在最广泛的意义上改善人类的体验。这一努力的成功依赖于它对思想和行动如何内在联系的概念。此外，古典实用主义还以某种非正统的方法来区分理论哲学和实践哲学而闻名，例如拥护(臭名昭著的)实践至上。与此同时，对于不同的实用主义作品之间是否存在统一性，人们几乎没有达成共识。尤其是在实践哲学方面，实用主义的含义确实是一个悬而未决的问题；而人与动物关系所产生的问题就是一个很好的例子。因此，由于主流学术动物伦理学已经走到了死胡同，特别是在它对社会政治实践的影响方面，我的目的是表明实用主义能够通过关注它的一些形而上学和认识论原理来改善辩论。这与理论哲学最近的一些发展是一致的；然而，主旨应该是承认人类是真正务实的生物，这意味着不能不行动的生物，因此应该努力采取更好的行动。情感哲学现在充当了通常被理解为属于理论哲学的问题和那些被视为属于实践哲学领域的问题之间的中介。事实上，在最近的研究中，关于经验的性质和情感在其中的作用的实用主义思想与当代关于情感的概念之间已经出现了重要的相似之处。我想用这些来解释一个案例，支持皮尔斯和杜威的古典实用主义的统一概念。我将从重构和批判情感在他们各自作品中的作用入手。接下来，我将探讨伦理学中的相关问题(例如，伦理学如何影响个人的规范性判断以及如何被个人的规范性判断影响的问题)和元伦理学中的相关问题(重要的是关于实用的元伦理实在论的问题)。最重要的是，尽管社会和政治机构对成功的行动(和调查)具有公认的重要性，但在皮尔斯和杜威中都存在一种非常有趣的势头，强调个人(准道德)行为的重要性，这似乎也与情感的作用有关；然而，需要进行更详细的分析。最后，就我的整个项目而言，使用这一研究奖学金对我来说至关重要，以便更准确地阐述我的一些方法承诺。

It is well known that classical philosophical pragmatism claimed being able to focus philosophical inquiry on supposedly real problems, and by doing so to improve human experience in the broadest sense. The success of this endeavor relied on its conception of how thought and action were inherently linked. Moreover, classical pragmatism is also known for a certain unorthodox approach towards the distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy, e.g. championing a (notorious) primacy of practice. At the same time there is little consensus on whether there is a unity to be found across the different pragmatist works. Especially, when it comes to practical philosophy, the implications of pragmatism are indeed an open question; and the problems arising from human-animal-relations are a very good example. Hence, inasmuch as mainstream academic animal ethics has reached a dead end, in particular with respect to its impact on sociopolitical practices, it is my aim to show that pragmatism is in a position to improve the debates by focusing on some of its metaphysical and epistemological tenets. This is in tune with some of the recent developments in theoretical philosophy; however, the gist should be acknowledging humans as genuinely pragmatic creatures, which means creatures who cannot but act and who, as it were, should therefore try to act better. The philosophy of emotion now acts as an intermediary between questions that are usually understood to belong to theoretical philosophy and those that are seen to fall into the sphere of practical philosophy. In fact, in recent research important similarities between pragmatist ideas, concerning the nature of experience and the role of emotions therein, and contemporary conceptions of emotions have emerged. I want to use these in order to construe a case in favor of a unitary conception of the classical pragmatism that can be found in Peirce and Dewey. I will proceed by reconstructing and criticizing the role of emotions in their respective works. Next, I will inquire into the related problems in ethics (e.g. with respect to the question of how ethics can influence and can be influenced by individual normative judgment) and in metaethics (importantly with respect to the question of a pragmatic metaethical realism). On top of that, notwithstanding the acknowledged importance of social and political institutions for succesful actions (and inquiry), there is a very interesting momentum present both in Peirce and Dewey that stresses the importance of individual (quasi-virtuous) conduct, which seems to be related to the role of emotions as well; however, a more detailed analysis is needed. Finally, with respect to my project as a whole it is of utmost importance to me to use this research fellowship in order to state some of my methodological commitments more precisely.