Towards a Multidimensional Theory of Wisdom

该项目的基本概念主要基于规范认识论领域，它是明智决策的概念，由此将进一步解释诸如个人智慧或作为一种价值的智慧等核心智慧概念。这一描述的主要好处在于提供了一个可独立测量的个人智慧概念，这对进一步的实证研究特别有用。该项目分为三个主要工作领域：(1)在什么条件下才能将决策描述为明智的？我们将在智慧归因的情境主义理论的更广泛框架内，对明智决策做出定义。我们还对两种智慧归因进行了区分，即归因和状语归因。(2)传统的和现代的智慧理论通常只关注个人智慧的概念。虽然这些相互竞争的方法试图直接根据认知和其他个人特征来定义个人智慧，但我们却走了相反的路，将聪明人定义为具有做出明智决定的倾向的人。这种方法是简化的，因为它将明智的人的概念建立在明智的决定的概念上。关键的优势在于能够独立地操作这两个方面，这特别为以经验为导向的个人智慧理论提供了优越的基础。(3)第三个项目领域旨在解释智慧的认识价值。虽然智慧的实践价值经常被提及，尤其是在伦理学领域，但在当前的认识论讨论中，智慧的认识价值却被严重低估。相反，讨论的是辩护、知识或最近的理解的概念。根据我们的观点，这种预先强调是没有充分依据的。我们认为，科学和认识论实践的总体目标之一是为改善我们的现状做出重大贡献。这正是我们定义的明智决定。智慧尤其具有认识论价值，因为它是我们从事科学工作时追求的能力之一；因此，它不能被简化为其他东西，如真理、理由或知识。

The basic concept of this project, which is primarily based in the field of normative epistemology, is the concept of a wise decision, from which further central concepts of wisdom such as personal wisdom or wisdom as a value will be construed. The main benefit of this account consists in providing an independently measurable concept of personal wisdom which is specifically useful for further empirical research. The project is divided into three major fields of work:(1) Under what conditions can a decision characterized as being wise? We are going to develop a definition of wise decisions within a broader framework of a contextualist theory of wisdom attributions. We also develop a distinction between two kinds of wisdom attributions, namely attributive and adverbial attributions.(2) Traditional as well as current theories of wisdom usually address the concept of personal wisdom exclusively. While such competing approaches try to define personal wisdom directly in terms of cognitive and other personal characteristics, we go the opposite way and define a wise person as a person who has the disposition to decide wisely. This approach is reductive insofar as it bases the concept of a wise person on the concept of wise decisions. The key advantage consists in being able to operationalize both aspects independently from each other, which provides a superior base especially for empirically oriented theories of personal wisdom.(3) The third project area aims to explain the epistemic value of wisdom. While the practical value of wisdom is often referred to especially in the field of ethics, the epistemic value of wisdom is highly underexposed in the current epistemological discussion. What is discussed instead are rather the concepts of justification, knowledge or, most recently, understanding. This preemphasis is, according to our view, not sufficiently founded. We argue that one of the goals of science and epistemic practice in general is to make significant contributions to the improvement of our current situation. This is exactly as we define wise decisions. Wisdom is, among other things, epistemically valuable because it is one of the capacities we aim for when doing science; and it can as such not be reduced to other things such as truth, justification, or knowledge.