Investigating the effects of decision rules in group decision making - Theory and Experiments

我们的目标是有助于理论和经验的理解，群体决策的替代决策规则的影响。我们将特别感兴趣的是，在一致性规则和（简单的合格的）多数规则之间的比较。除其他外，我们感兴趣的是这些规则对谈判进程和时间长短的影响，以及由此产生的协定的效率。这些考虑意味着在"决策成本"和与不同规则相关的可能的"外部成本"之间进行权衡。虽然一致性规则可能与高决策成本相关，但其他规则可能导致外部成本。我们的理论和实验项目将研究这种权衡，并产生新的见解，在这种情况下，一种或另一种类型的规则可能会产生更好的整体结果。

Our objective is to contribute to a theoretical and empirical understanding of the effects of alternative decision rules on group decision making. We will be especially interested in the comparison between unanimity rule and (simple of qualified) majority rules. Among other things, we are interested in the effects of these rules on the process and length of negotiations, as well as the efficiency of the resulting agreements. These considerations imply a tradeoff between the "decision costs" and the possible "external costs" associated with different rules. While unanimity rule is likely to be associated with high decision costs, other rules may lead to external costs. Our theoretical and experimental projects will investigate this tradeoff and produce new insights concerning the circumstances under which one or the other type of rule is likely to produce better overall results.