Optimal Renewable Energy Policies over Time: Policy Commitment vs. Policy Discretion

在推动大规模部署可再生能源时，政策制定者面临着很大的不确定性，特别是在相应的未来政策成本方面。不确定性意味着，从长远来看，资源政策可能会被证明是设计不当的，无法有效地刺激资源的部署。作为回应，资源政策可能会随着时间的推移进行调整，以考虑到关于其影响的新信息和知识。然而，调整资源政策的选择也是有代价的。预见到这种潜在政策调整的私人资源投资者可能会在战略上持有必要的资源投资，特别是在此类投资不可逆转的情况下。因此，对未来政策调整的预期可能会损害有效实现雄心勃勃的资源部署目标。在此背景下，本研究方案旨在探索资源政策的最优长期设计。政策制定者是否应该致力于一条预先定义的长期资源政策路径？或者，是否应该允许他们在必要时酌情调整政策框架？为了回答这些问题，该研究提案开发了一个经济局部均衡模型，该模型允许在存在不确定性、路径依赖和私人代理人的战略行为的情况下检验最优RE政策选择。这项研究将由牛津大学新经济思维研究所进行。

When promoting the large-scale deployment of renewable energy sources (RES), policy-makers face substantial uncertainties, particularly regarding the corresponding future policy costs. Uncertainty implies that RES policies may turn out to be ill-designed to stimulate RES deployment efficiently in the long-run. As a response, RES policies may be adjusted over time to account for new information and knowledge on their impacts. However, the option to adjust RES policies also comes at a cost. Private RES investors which foresee such potential policy adjustments may strategically hold-up necessary RES investments, particularly if such investments are irreversible. Thus, the expectation of future policy adjustments may impair the efficient attainment of ambitious RES deployment targets. Against this background, this research proposal aims to explore the optimal long-term design of RES policies. Should policy-makers be committed to a pre-defined long-term RES policy pathway? Or should they be allowed the discretion to adjust the policy framework if necessary? To answer these questions, the research proposal develops an economic partial equilibrium model which allows examining optimal RES policy options in the presence of uncertainty, path dependencies and strategic behavior of private agents. The research shall be carried out the Institute of New Economic Thinking at the University of Oxford.