Design of Financial Governance (DEFIGO)

全球金融市场监管在问题领域和部门之间表现出制度差异。例如，银行的最低资本要求是由央行行长组成的跨政府机构BCBS提出的，而会计准则是由私人机构IASB制定的。一些机构，如政府间的国际货币基金组织（IMF）颁布（更具）约束力的规则，而其他机构，如国际会计准则理事会（IASB）则依赖于自愿监管。该项目提出的问题是：(1)哪些制度设计可以区分？(2)制度差异是如何随着时间发展的？(3)如何解释制度设计的差异？(1)本项目分析了两个设计特征：(a)制度主体类型，(b)法制化。关于(a)我们一方面区分了公共和私人行为者，另一方面区分了内阁级（非授权）或独立/行政（授权）行为者，产生了四种行为者形式：政府间、跨政府、跨国和跨国公私合营（PPP）。关于(b)，我们关注法规的硬性和软性。(2)我们开发了一个理论上的编码方案来衡量这两个属性，加上一些普遍感兴趣的制度特征，并为全球金融监管的所有机构编制了一个新的金融治理设计数据集（DEFIGOD），这些机构可以在六个不同的时间点（成立年份，1963年，1980年，1998年，2007年和2015年）进行识别。基于此数据集，该项目系统地测试了许多众所周知的描述性假设。(3)为了解释制度设计选择，我们提出了几个假设。(a)关于制度类型，我们考虑(i)经济实力，（ii）国家监管机构的制度能力，（iii）资源依赖，以及（iv）政治机会的考虑。关于合法化，我们的假设是基于(i)可信承诺问题的严重程度，（ii）分配冲突的严重程度，（iii）制度设计者之间的权力差异以及（iv）各自问题领域的复杂性。在这些假设的基础上，我们开发了与两种感兴趣的结果相关联的条件。采用模糊集QCA进行分析。该项目对新的治理模式和合法化的文献做出了贡献，并将其扩展到全球金融治理领域。这些领域的工作大多是单一案例研究或集中于少数案例。相比之下，该项目旨在在大量案例的基础上进行系统的实证分析。其次，尽管国际政治经济学中心关于全球金融的文献中有很大一部分描述了国际金融监管的缺陷，但缺乏对这些缺陷的政治决定因素的系统分析，但这是本项目的核心，应该有助于任何重新监管全球金融的努力。

Global financial market regulation exhibits institutional variation across issue areas and sectors. For example, minimum capital requirements for banks are sponsored by the BCBS, a transgovernmental body of central bankers, while accounting principles are developed by a private body, the IASB. Some institutions, like the intergovernmental IMF promulgate (more) binding rules, while others, like the IASB rely on voluntary regulations. The proposed project asks: (1) which institutional designs can be distinguished? (2) How has institutional variation developed over time? (3) How can we explain the variance of institutional design?(1) The project analyzes two design features: (a) types of institutional actors, and (b) legalization. With respect to (a) we distinguish between public and private actors on the one hand and cabinet level (non-delegated) or independent/administrative (delegated) actors on the other, yielding four types of actor forms: intergovernmental, transgovernmental, transnational, and transnational public-private (PPP). With respect to (b) we focus on the hardness and softness of regulations.(2) We develop a theoretically informed coding scheme to measure these two attributes, plus a number of institutional features of general interest and compile a new Design of Financial Governance Dataset (DEFIGOD) for all institutions of global financial regulation that can be identified at six different points in time (founding year, 1963, 1980, 1998, 2007 and 2015). Based on this dataset the project systematically tests a number of well-known descriptive hypotheses. (3) In order to explain the institutional design choices, we develop several hypotheses. (a) With respect to institutional type, we look at (i) economic power, (ii) institutional capacity of national regulatory bodies, (iii) resource dependence, and (iv) considerations of political opportunity. Concerning legalization, our hypotheses are based on (i) the severity of credible commitment problems, (ii) the severity of distributive conflict, (iii) power differentials among institutional designers and (iv) complexity of the respective issue area. On the basis of these hypotheses we develop conditions that can be linked to the two outcomes of interest. The analysis is carried out as a fuzzy-set QCA.This project contributes to the literatures on new modes of governance and on legalization and extends them to the realm of global financial governance. Works in these areas have mostly been single case studies or focused on a small number of cases. In contrast, the project aims at a systematic empirical analysis on the basis of a large number of cases. Second, while a significant part of the IPE literature on global finance describes the shortcomings of international financial regulation, systematic analysis of the political determinants of these weaknesses is lacking, but is center-stage in this project and should be instrumental in any effort to re-regulate global finance.