Contextual-Epistemic 2D Semantics, the Cogito-A Priori, and the Problem of Intentionality

许多精神状态代表着世界的特征，也就是说，它们有内容。旨在解释心理状态如何产生内容的哲学理论被称为意向性理论，而旨在表征这些内容的理论被称为心理内容理论。该项目的中心目标是开发一个将心理内容理论整合到意向性理论中的帐户。这一解释的基础是一种新的二维主义精神内容理论，它将内容与我所说的思想联系起来--先验，即主体在没有接受任何感官输入的情况下可以知道的东西。那么，什么是思想--个人的先验，承诺解释一个主体的精神状态是如何产生内容的。

Many mental states represent features of the world, that is to say, they have contents. Philosophical theories that aim to explain how mental states come to have contents are called theories of intentionality, and theories that aim to characterize these contents are called theories of mental content.The central aim of the project is to develop an account that integrates a theory of mental content into a theory of intentionality. The basis for this account is a new kind of two-dimensionalist theory of mental content that connects contents with what I call the cogito-a priori, which corresponds to what a subject can know without receiving any sensory input. What is cogito-a priori for an individual, then, promises to explain how the mental states of a subject come to have contents.