Mechanisms of epistemic change in higher education (MEPIC)

在一个后真相时代——谣言、假新闻和“另类事实”在全球迅速传播——科学或基于科学的信息的接受者不断被要求评估知识主张和权衡有争议的证据。认知信念（关于知识本质的个人信念）是这一过程的主要预测因素。例如，评估主义——一种认为知识主张的相对“正确性”取决于其论证质量、证据和背景的信念——对信息处理和来源评估的差异性有积极影响。相反，认为科学知识是由主观意见组成的信念（多元信念）会干扰这种结果。虽然关于认知信念的概念化和结构的理论和实证研究相当普遍，但关于这些信念如何随时间变化的心理过程（“认知变化”）所知甚少。因此，MEPIC项目旨在从经验上验证和扩展该领域最突出的框架，即Bendixen和Rule（2004）的个人认识论发展过程模型。该框架提出了认知改变的三种相互关联的心理机制：认知怀疑（个人质疑他们的认知信念）、认知意志（投入持续努力改变信念的意图）和解决策略（解决认知怀疑的策略，如反思或社会互动）。尽管在两三个研究中发现了认知怀疑的证据，但对其他两个组成部分知之甚少，对个体差异因素（例如，控制点、认知能力、个性）如何与特定模型组成部分相互作用的了解就更少了。由于这些模型组件很难用语言表达，因此直接评估（例如，通过问卷调查）是有问题的。因此，选择了一种不同的方法：基于已被证明非常适合引起认知怀疑的现有心理特定干预，将开发与不同模型组件相关的进一步干预模块。在两个独立的实验研究中，将测试这些模块对认知变化的增量效应以及它们的差异效应，例如对不同人格风格的影响。从理论的角度来看，标注方法的优势在于它使模型组件可见，而不依赖于自我报告。作为一个积极的副作用，新设计的模块可以直接用于未来的干预措施。由于适当的理论框架是设计良好干预措施的必要前提，因此MEPIC项目将很好地为研究人员和实践者服务——而且，从长远来看，它甚至可能有助于解决社会最紧迫的挑战之一：帮助个人理清真相和谎言。

In an era of post truth - with rumors, fake news, and "alternative facts" spreading quickly across the globe - recipients of scientific or science-based information are constantly required to evaluate knowledge claims and weigh controversial evidence. Epistemic beliefs (individual beliefs about the nature of knowledge) are a central predictor of such processes. For example, evaluativism - a belief that the relative "correctness" of knowledge claims varies depending on their argumentative quality, evidence, and context - has positive effects on the differentiatedness of information processing and source evaluation. Beliefs that scientific knowledge consists of subjective opinions (multiplistic beliefs), in contrast, interfere with such outcomes. While theoretical and empirical works on the conceptualization and structure of epistemic beliefs are quite common, not much is known on the psychological processes involved in how such beliefs change over time ("epistemic change").The MEPIC project therefore aims at empirically validating and extending the most prominent framework in this area, the Process Model for Personal Epistemology Development by Bendixen and Rule (2004). The framework posits three interrelated psychological mechanisms for epistemic change: epistemic doubt (individuals questioning their epistemic beliefs), epistemic volition (the intention to devote sustained effort to belief change), and resolution strategies (strategies to resolve epistemic doubt; e.g., reflection or social interaction). Whereas evidence for epistemic doubt has been found in two or three studies, not much is known about the two other components, and even less is known on how individual difference factors (e.g., locus of control, cognitive ability, personality) interact with specific model components. Since these model components are hard to verbalize, a direct assessment (e.g., by questionnaires) is problematic. Therefore, a different method is chosen: Based on an existing psychology-specific intervention that has proven well-suited to evoke epistemic doubt, further intervention modules relating to the different model components will be developed. In two separate experimental studies, these modules' incremental effects on epistemic change as well as their differential efficacy, for example with regard to different personality styles, will be tested. From a theoretical standpoint, the denoted approach has the advantage that it makes model components visible without relying on self-reports. As a positive side effect, the newly designed modules may directly be used in future interventions.Since an adequate theoretical framework constitutes an essential prerequisite for designing good interventions, the MEPIC project will thus serve well to both researchers and practitioners - and, in the long term, it might even contribute to solving one of society's most pressing challenges: helping individuals to disentangle truth and untruth.