The Relation between Recognition Theory and Theories of Epistemic Injustice

最近，在英美语境中，认知不公正与承认概念之间的关系引起了人们的兴趣。这样的调查集中在认知不公正理论和认知理论的一般关系上，诸如知者的规范地位或抵制结构性认知不公正的可能性等问题。此外，沉默和认知排斥的做法产生的后果远远超出了认知层面，并影响了我们的社会实践，例如，给予尊重、尊重和爱。因此，对认识上的不公正、压迫和暴力与错误识别有关的调查在不止一个方面被证明是富有成效的。德国的语境为这样的调查提供了一个特别有希望的语境，因为它有着悠久的批判理论和与之相关的认知理论。然而，到目前为止，在当代德国哲学中，还没有关于认知不公正或沉默和认知排斥方面的重大研究。即使在英美语境下，研究也只集中在《女权主义哲学季刊》的一期特刊和即将出版的一本选集上；两者都是关于哲学中这两个领域之间关系的不同观点的一般集合，并没有提供关于这种特定关系及其对应用哲学其他邻近理论和领域的影响的系统理论。在德国和国际上缺少的是，这个网络旨在提供的是：第一，系统地调查不同类型的认识不公正和(错误)承认形式之间的不同关系；第二，阐明认识不公正和错误认识的一般理论；第三，将上述理论应用于世界上当前的社会现象，如移徙、气候变化、性别歧视和种族主义、残疾人权利运动和跨*激进主义。到目前为止，人们对认知不公正理论和认知理论之间关系的日益关注表明，认知理论的见解可以显著改进和丰富对认知不公正的分析和批评；例如，通过揭示认知不公正的结构性，通过设想(在认知上)尊重其他社会群体和社区的潜在方法。网络试图实现的系统化的方法和一般理论的阐明也应该考虑到认知理论不同分支之间的显著差异，以及沉默、认知排斥和无知理论之间的差异，这就是为什么网络成员既包括来自不同认知理论分支的专家，也包括不同的沉默和无知理论。

Recently, there has been interest in the relation between epistemic injustice and the concept of recognition in the Anglo-American context. Such inquiries focus on the general relation of theories of epistemic injustices and recognition theory, questions such as the normative status of the knower or the possibility of resisting structural epistemic injustices. Furthermore, practices of silencing and epistemic exclusion have consequences that go well beyond the epistemic dimension and that influence our social practices, for example, of giving respect, esteem, and love. Thus, the investigation of epistemic injustice, oppression, and violence in relation to misrecognition proves fruitful in more than one way. The German context provides a particularly promising context for such inquiries because of its long tradition of Critical Theory and, relatedly, recognition theory. Yet, so far, there is no significant research on epistemic injustices or on aspects of silencing and epistemic exclusion in relation to theories of recognition within contemporary German philosophy. And even within the Anglo-American context, research is concentrated in only one special issue in Feminist Philosophy Quarterly and one forthcoming anthology; both being general collections of different ideas on the relation between these two fields within philosophy and do not provide a systematic theory of this particular relation and its consequences for other neighboring theories and areas of applied philosophy. What is missing--both in Germany and internationally--and what this network aims to provide, is: First, a systematic approach that investigates the distinct relation between the different kinds of epistemic injustice and forms of (mis)recognition; second, an elucidation of a general theory of epistemic injustice and misrecognition; and, third, an application of said theory regarding current social phenomena in the world, such as migration, climate change, sexism and racism, disability rights movements, trans* activism. The developing interest in the relation between theories of epistemic injustice and recognition theory so far shows that analysis and critique of epistemic injustices can be significantly improved and fruitfully enriched by the insights from recognition theory; for example, by bringing to light the structural nature of epistemic injustice and by envisioning potential ways to (epistemically) respect other social groups and communities. The systematic approach and elucidation of a general theory that the network aims to accomplish should also bear in mind the significant differences between distinct branches of recognition theory as well as the differences between theories of silencing, epistemic exclusion, and ignorance, which is why the network members include both experts from different branches of recognition theory as well as different theories of silencing and ignorance.