A Study on Enforcement in the Institution of Intellectual Property Rights

首先，我们研究了知识产权（IPR）的执行对均衡结果和福利的影响，通过许可的双寡头企业之间的两个互补技术的专利。我们探讨了垄断/双寡头垄断的无效率/有效率社会剩余实现的条件，即知识产权执法的力度和侵权企业的诉讼成本。其次，我们构建了一个由两个（一个发达国家和一个发展中国家）出口国企业和一个进口国企业组成的三国国际贸易博弈模型。通过对发达国家企业知识产权技术许可、知识产权权利用尽和知识产权侵权诉讼的分析，得到了一个子博弈完美纳什均衡。第三，考察了当跨国药品价格差异不仅是由于需求弹性因素，而且由于政府干预因素而产生时，平行进口对药品创新和经济福利的影响。 ...更多信息 影响药品价格控制的主要因素。通过明确考虑政府药品价格控制的因素，我们表明，平行进口可能会促进药品创新，在一定条件下的讨价还价能力的外国政府和国外市场的需求价格弹性。我们还表明，增加的R&D引起的平行进口，甚至可能会增加消费者剩余的一个国家的高需求弹性，这可能会面临相对较低的药品价格，如果平行进口是不允许的。第四，我们研究的效果，知识产权执法的均衡结果和福利，通过单方面和交叉许可决定的双寡头企业之间的两个互补技术的专利。我们发现了在双方可能签订单边许可/交叉许可协议的情况下，双寡头垄断的有效社会剩余实现的条件，即侵权方的模仿成本和原告企业胜诉的概率。少

Firstly, we examine the effect of enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) on the equilibrium outcome and welfare through licensing between duopolistic firms with patents of two complementary technologies. We explore a condition on the extent of enforcement of IPR and the litigation cost of the infringer firm under which inefficient/ efficient social surplus of monopoly/duopoly realizes.Secondly, we construct a three country international trade game model which are composed of two (one developed and another developing) exporting countries' firms and one importing country. By dealing with licensing of developed country's firm technology with IPR, exhaustion of IPR and litigation for infringement of her IPR, we derive a sub game perfect Nash equilibrium.Thirdly, we examine how parallel importation influences pharmaceutical innovation and the welfare of the economy, when cross national drug price differentials occur not only because of demand elasticity based factors, but governm … More ental drug price control based factors. By explicitly considering the governmental drug price control based factors, we show that parallel importation may enhance pharmaceutical innovation, under some conditions on the bargaining power of a foreign government and the price elasticity of demand in the foreign market. We also show that the increase in R&D induced by parallel imports may even increase the consumer surplus of a country with high demand elasticities and which could face relatively low drug prices, if parallel imports were not allowed.Fourthly, we examine the effect of enforcement of IPR on the equilibrium outcome and welfare through unilateral and cross licensing decisions between duopolistic firms with patents of two complementary technologies. We find the conditions on both the imitation cost of the infringer and the probability of the accuser firm winning the lawsuit under that a unilateral licensing/ a cross licensing may be contracted between them, and efficient social surplus of duopoly realizes. Less