Strategic Effects of R」ヲD Investments

在这项研究中，我们考察了R&D投资对技术先进企业和落后企业之间技术许可谈判的影响，以及信息和专利制度的作用。此外，我们打算处理相关讨价还价博弈领域的理论问题。在我们的主要模型中，基于无限时间范围和代理应对足够复杂策略的能力，可以通过许可可能性来提高效率。结果类似于重复博弈中的结果，但在这种讨价还价的背景下并未得到承认，因为背景有所不同。在项目的最后一年，我们研究了信息问题-研发投资水平的可观性影响，以及专利的有限寿命。在每一种情况下，都验证了效应具有预期的迹象，但由于解决方案或模式的多样性，无法进行详细的分析；对于研发投入水平缺乏可观性，可以肯定的是，随着投资对讨价还价的影响变得脆弱，许可激励薄弱。然而，这种情况是一种信号博弈，因此出现了与预期模式多样化相对应的过多均衡。此外，专利的有限寿命产生了预期中的降低许可激励的效果。然而，这种激励并不一定随着专利的长度而单调变化，根据投资成本增长的形式，延长寿命不会带来任何交易。在理论方面，我们启动了一个项目，研究许多技术先进和落后的国家分别联合起来，在投资二氧化碳减排项目的背景下就技术转让进行讨价还价的理论框架，试图缓解全球变暖问题。

In this research, we investigate the effect of R&D investments on the bargaining over licensing a technology between technologically advanced and trailing firms, as well as the role of information and the patent system. Besides, we intend to deal with theoretical issues in the related field of bargaining games.In our main model based upon infinite time horizon and agents' ability to cope with sufficiently complex strategies, efficiency could be improved by licensing possibilities. The result is analogous to the one in repeated games but has not been recognized in this bargaining context, as the setting is somewhat different.In this last year of the project, we examined the issue of information-the effect of observability of the R&D investment level, and the finite life of a patent. In each case, it was verified that the effect has the expected sign, while a detailed analysis cannot be carried out due to the multiplicity of the solution or the patterns.As for the lack of observability of R&D investment level, one can confirm that licensing incentive weakness as the effect of investment over bargaining becomes tenuous. However, the situation is one of the signaling games and so a plethora of equilibria emerges corresponding to diversity of the patterns of expectations.Also the finite life of patent yields the well-expected effect of reducing the incentive for licensing. However, the incentive does not necessarily change monotonically with the length of the patent and depending on the shape of investment cost growth, lengthening the life could induce no deal.As to the theoretical aspects, we have launched a project examining theoretical framework in which many technologically advanced and trailing nations, banding together respectively, bargain over technology transfer in the context of investment in the CO2 emission reduction projects in an attempt to mitigate the global warming problem.