reexamination of the foundation of cooperative game theory and its applications

基础研究计划旨在通过对联盟形成模型的研究，澄清合作博弈论中的原始要素。作为将Bloch、Ray和Vohra类型分析扩展到广泛博弈的第一次尝试，我们采用了连续的讨价还价博弈，并研究了联盟形成的模式。在线性效用情况下，我们得到了一个结果，即参与者对是否组成联盟是无关紧要的，这一点听起来很明显，但在多人讨价还价理论的背景下并不明显。当我们试图将这种分析推广到非线性效用情况时，我们遇到了代表性讨价还价(或效用误述)问题。为了避免这种情况，我们考虑了这样一种情况，即一个联盟没有能力承诺进行收益再分配。我们还没有得到一般的结果，但对于CRRA效用博弈的有序独立均衡，我们得到了所得到的联盟结构由具有最多风险厌恶参与者和可能具有相对最小风险厌恶参与者的联盟组成，以及在连续消除上述联盟之后的类似联盟。此外，我们完成了对具有时间结构的讨价还价问题的合作和非合作分析的研究，并且在应用方面，我们为发展中国家参与后京都气候变化框架和基于项目的机制之间的关系的研究做了准备。前者的结果不仅扩展了传统的分析方法，而且为研究承诺能力在时间维度上受限的联盟的效应提供了可能。后一种观点表明，在面临未来不确定性的经典联盟形成问题--联盟规模太小和效率低下--中，有可能对外部人士的激励进行分析。

Basic Research program aims at clarifying the primitive elements in the cooperative game theory through a study of the coalition formation model. As a first attempt to extend Bloch, Ray and Vohra type analysis to extensive games, we took up sequential bargaining games and examined the patterns of coalition formation. Under linear utilities, we obtained a result that players are indifferent between forming a coalition or not, which, though sounding obvious, is not that obvious in the context of multi-person bargaining theory When we tried to extend this analysis to nonlinear utility case, then we encountered the problem of the representative bargaining (or utility misrepresentation) problem. To avoid this, we consider the case where a coalition lacking the ability to commit to a payoff redistribution. We did not get the general result yet, but for order independent equilibria of the game with CRRA utilities, we obtain that resulting coalition structure consists of coalitions with most risk averse players and possibly with one relatively least risk averse player, and the similar one after eliminating the aforementioned coalitions successively.Besides, we finalized the investigation of the cooperative and non-cooperative analysis of bargaining problems with a time 'structure, and also on the application front, we advanced preparation for the study of the relationship between the involvement of developing countries to post-Kyoto framework for preventing climate change, and project-based mechanisms. The former result, not only extends the conventional analysis, but also opens up a possibility to investigate the effect of a coalition whose commitment ability is limited along the time dimension. The latter perspective suggest the possibility of an analysis of incentive for outsiders in a classical coalition formation problem of too mall and inefficient coalition forming, facing future uncertainty.