reexamination of the foundation of cooperative game theory and its applications

基础研究计划旨在通过对联盟形成模型的研究，阐明合作博弈论的基本要素。作为将Bloch， Ray和Vohra类型分析扩展到广泛博弈的第一次尝试，我们采用了顺序议价博弈并研究了联盟形成的模式。在线性效用下，我们得到了一个结果，即参与者在组成联盟或不组成联盟之间是无关紧要的，尽管这听起来很明显，但在多人议价理论的背景下并不那么明显。当我们试图将这一分析扩展到非线性效用情况时，我们遇到了代表性议价（或效用虚假陈述）问题。为了避免这种情况，我们考虑了联盟缺乏承诺收益再分配能力的情况。我们还没有得到一般的结果，但是对于具有CRRA效用的博弈的序独立均衡，我们得到了最终的联盟结构由具有大多数风险厌恶者的联盟和可能具有一个相对最小风险厌恶者的联盟，以及依次消除上述联盟后的类似联盟组成。此外，我们完成了时间结构下的合作与非合作议价问题分析的研究，并在应用方面，我们为研究发展中国家参与后京都气候变化框架与基于项目的机制之间的关系做了准备。前者的研究结果不仅扩展了传统的分析，而且为研究承诺能力有限的联盟在时间维度上的影响开辟了可能性。后一种观点提出了在面对未来不确定性的联盟组建规模过小且效率低下的经典联盟组建问题中分析外部人员激励的可能性。

Basic Research program aims at clarifying the primitive elements in the cooperative game theory through a study of the coalition formation model. As a first attempt to extend Bloch, Ray and Vohra type analysis to extensive games, we took up sequential bargaining games and examined the patterns of coalition formation. Under linear utilities, we obtained a result that players are indifferent between forming a coalition or not, which, though sounding obvious, is not that obvious in the context of multi-person bargaining theory When we tried to extend this analysis to nonlinear utility case, then we encountered the problem of the representative bargaining (or utility misrepresentation) problem. To avoid this, we consider the case where a coalition lacking the ability to commit to a payoff redistribution. We did not get the general result yet, but for order independent equilibria of the game with CRRA utilities, we obtain that resulting coalition structure consists of coalitions with most risk averse players and possibly with one relatively least risk averse player, and the similar one after eliminating the aforementioned coalitions successively.Besides, we finalized the investigation of the cooperative and non-cooperative analysis of bargaining problems with a time 'structure, and also on the application front, we advanced preparation for the study of the relationship between the involvement of developing countries to post-Kyoto framework for preventing climate change, and project-based mechanisms. The former result, not only extends the conventional analysis, but also opens up a possibility to investigate the effect of a coalition whose commitment ability is limited along the time dimension. The latter perspective suggest the possibility of an analysis of incentive for outsiders in a classical coalition formation problem of too mall and inefficient coalition forming, facing future uncertainty.