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Cognitional Behavior and Economic Welfare

认知行为与经济福利

基本信息

批准号：
13630051
负责人：
IMAI Haruo
金额：
$ 1.09万
依托单位：
Kyoto University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2001
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2001 至 2003
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-13630051/
关键词：
bounded rationality advertising competition limited memory

项目摘要

Upshot of the research is to model advertising competition when consumers' memories are limited, and to conduct welfare analysis based upon full-memory "meta"-preference. We chose items of consumption themselves as objectives of memory, and consider the process where advertising message remind people of the presence of a certain consumption item. To justify such situation, we hypothesized dynamically changing tastes of consumers, and competition is over the space in the working memory of consumers on marginal items of consumption.We first developed a general model where consumers dynamic taste is of durable good type, and their limited memories are under influence of inertia Also we assumed that there is a process by which at most one of the firms' advertising messages reach each consumer. For a static analysis of competition including the choice of price, we duplicated the example raised by Shapiro as a counterexample to the Dixit and Norman's welfare criterion. General dynamic analysis in this case is complex and we only list singular solutions.Another attempt is to investigate the case of single firm's decision. We chase campaign competition among two NGO's where one NGO's advertising level is fixed, as the setup for this attempt. We found out oscillatory behavior of NGO's advertising level, and welfare effect depends upon consumers valuation on the activity campaigned.Finally, we analyzed the case of dynamic advertising competition among firms with fixed price and with random preference and independent memories on the side of consumers. By means of Markov Perfect Equilibrium, we came up with an explicit solution which yielded an oscillatory behavior again. Comparative static property seemed very complex, and aided by numerical analysis, we found negative welfare effect when firm's advertising technology successfully shields its client from other firm's campaign message, but this effect is not nay universal.

本研究的结论是建立消费者记忆有限时的广告竞争模型，并基于完全记忆的“Meta”偏好进行福利分析。我们选择消费项目本身作为记忆的目标，并考虑广告信息提醒人们某个消费项目存在的过程。为了证明这种情况，我们假设消费者的动态变化的口味，竞争是在消费者的工作记忆的空间上的边缘消费项目。我们首先开发了一个一般模型，其中消费者的动态口味是持久的好类型，他们有限的记忆力受到惯性的影响。我们还假设，有一个过程，通过这个过程，最多一个公司的广告信息到达每个公司。消费者的对于包括价格选择在内的竞争的静态分析，我们复制了夏皮罗提出的例子，作为迪塞尔和诺曼福利标准的反例。一般的动态分析在这种情况下是复杂的，我们只列出奇异的解决方案。另一个尝试是调查的情况下，单个企业的决策。我们在两个非政府组织之间进行竞选竞争，其中一个非政府组织的广告水平是固定的，作为这种尝试的设置。我们发现NGO的广告水平存在振荡行为，福利效应取决于消费者对广告活动的评价。最后，我们分析了固定价格、消费者随机偏好和独立记忆的企业之间的动态广告竞争情况。通过马尔可夫完全均衡，我们得到了一个显式解，该解再次产生振荡行为。比较静态特性看起来非常复杂，通过数值分析，我们发现当企业的广告技术成功地屏蔽了其他企业的广告信息时，会产生负的福利效应，但这种效应并不普遍。