"On The Relationship between Incentive Regulation for Public Utilities and their Firm Structures"

该研究项目历时两年，即1997年和1998年所作的贡献载于以下两份文件1。“受管制企业的战略性劳资谈判”本文考察了公用事业等受管制企业的劳资谈判特征。一种通常用他们在劳资谈判中拥有的讨价还价能力来解释一家公司(即包括受监管的公司)内经理和工人(或工会)之间的收入分配。本文的分析表明，管制的存在会对管制下企业内部的收入分配产生影响。特别是，研究表明，受监管企业的管理者可以以企业工人获得的收益为代价来增加自己的收益，特别是当监管者在没有关于企业成本的完全信息的情况下(即在不对称信息下)采取机会主义行为来确定受监管价格的水平时。“对外部分包商的垄断和更多的监管”(本文源于早先的两个草案，题为“垄断监管下的垂直贸易中的有效讨价还价”和“垄断监管下的分包合同中的有效讨价还价”。)本文研究了公用事业监管与设施工厂的分包合同或公用事业行业的中间产品购买之间的关系。在对第一个问题的分析中，比较了两种不同的讨价还价形式：一种是“有效议价”，另一种是“排他性定价”。研究表明，在信息不对称的情况下，即使监管者(或被监管者)的议价能力在有效讨价还价中相当弱，从社会福利的角度来看，分包合同的有效议价可能比排他性定价要好。原因在于，有效的讨价还价可以减少被管制企业通过公用事业管制获得的更多信息租金。对于第二个问题，即关于分包合同委托的可能性，分析表明，如果(1)公用事业项目很大，或(2)分包商用于生产中间产品的技术良好，则监管者倾向于将委托给受监管的公司。较少

The contributions made by the research project for two years, i.e., 1997 and 1998, are presented in the following two papers.1. "Strategic Labor Bargaining of Regulated Firms"This paper examines the characteristics of labor bargaining of firms under regulation, like public utilities. One usually explains the income distribution between managers and workers (or a labor union) within a firm in general, i.e., including regulated firms, in terms of the bargaining power they own in a labor bargaining. The analysis in this paper shows that the existence of a regulation can have an effect on the income distribution within a firm under the regulation. In particular, it is shown that the manager of a regulated firm can increase her gain at the cost of the gain the workers of the firm obtain, especially when a regulator take an opportunistic behavior to determine the level of regulated price without the complete information on the firm's cost (i.e., under an asymmetric information).2. "Monopoly … More Regulation with an Outside Subcontractor"(This paper stems from the two earlier drafts entitled "Efficient Bargaining in Vertical Trade under Monopoly Regulation" and "Efficient Bargaining in Subcontracts under Monopoly Regulation".)This paper examines the relationship between public utility regulation and subcontracts for facility plants or the purchase of intermediate goods in public utility industries. It discusses two problems ; desirable bargaining forms of a subcontract under the regulation and a possibility of delegation of a subcontract to a regulated firm.In the analysis of the first problem, two particular bargaining forms are compared : One is called an "efficient bargaining", while the other is called an "exclusive price-setting". It is shown that under an asymmetric information, an efficient bargaining of the subcontract can be better than the exclusive price-setting from the social-welfare point of view, even if the bargaining power of a regulator (or a regulated firm) is quite weak in an efficient bargaining. The reason comes from the fact that the efficient bargaining can reduce more informational rent that the regulated firm obtains through the public utility regulation. For the second problem, i.e., on the possibility of delegation of a subcontract, the analysis shows that a regulator prefers the delegation to a regulated firm, when (1)the public-utility project is large, or (2) the technology that a subcontractor uses for a production of intermediate goods is good. Less