A study on the emergence of Power systems in artificial Societies.

本研究项目的主要成果如下。我研究了社会权力产生于社会交换网络的观点。在这里，强大的权力被认为是代理人获得他人合作而不给予他人自己合作的能力。假设有一种情况，其中一组代理人参与了他们之间的合作社会交换。代理人通过交换成功地从他人那里获得了很多合作，他们可以操纵强大的联盟并变得强大，因为他们可以更有效地惩罚他人。如果他们已经获得了强大的声誉，他们可以从较弱的其他人那里获得合作，而不必与其他人合作，包括他们的前交换伙伴。这是因为较弱的代理人无法抵抗强大的代理人，因为如果较弱的代理人与较弱的代理人合作，他们可能会受到强代理人的惩罚。计算机辅助思维实验表明，这种概念是相当不错的工作，除了上述分析，我还进行了计算机模拟分析，其重点是出现的交换规范，代理人的集群模式的出现，以及出现的选择性纳入机制，促进合作的社会困境的情况。

The main results of this research project are as follows. I examined the idea that social power emerges from a network of social exchange. Here, strong power is considered to be the agent's ability to gain others' cooperation without giving others its own cooperation. Suppose a situation where a set of agents are engaged in social exchange of cooperation among them. The agents, who are successful in gaining much cooperation from others through exchange, can manipulate strong coalitions and become powerful because they can punish others more effectively. If they have attained a reputation as strong, they can get cooperation from weaker others without giving their cooperation to others including their ex-exchange-partners. It is because weaker agents cannot resist strong ones, and because, if weaker agents give cooperation to weak agents, they may be punished by strong agents. Computer-aided thought experiments demonstrated that such notion worked fairly well.Besides the above analysis, I also conducted the computer simulation analyzes, whose focuses were on the emergence of exchange norms, the emergence of agents' clustering patterns, and the emergence of selective inclusion mechanisms which facilitate cooperation in Social Dilemma situations.