A STUDY ON INTERNALISTIC CHARACTER OF MORALS ; A VIEW POINT FOR FOUNDATION PROBLEM

由于学者们对道德的定义不同，以往对“道德基础”的设想结果也不尽相同。然而，这些项目都提到了“道德的内在性”。这意味着，很难用道德之外的理由来证明道德，而且这些理由最终会在道德内部循环。这也意味着道德只能约束那些接受道德体系本身的人，而这种“道德的内在性”在伦理学史上并不明显。特别是古代和中世纪的伦理学有这样的条件，“人的真正目的”或“上帝的法律”，在这些条件下，“为什么人应该是道德的？””，并不是什么严重的问题。其原因是，在上述条件下，人应该是道德的。但在现代时期，一种新型的神学（新教或詹森主义）断言，理性不能提供真正的理解， ...更多信息 人的真正目的是什么，现代伦理学实际上也不可能假定“人的真正目的”这样的前提。因此，对于现代伦理学来说，有必要证明道德并解释为什么人应该是道德的。然而，许多现代伦理学理论，如契约论和功利主义，都把道德看作是达到某种目的的手段，如“幸福”，因此道德的辩护是外在的，因此是不完整的。在这种情况下，康德试图推导出一个道德法则，但失败了。后来，他在《实践理性批判》中断言，道德法则是“理性的事实”。这是对内在主义的精确阐述。但他的内在主义因其独断的思想和其道德的排他性和严格性而受到批评。另一方面，康德试图论证道德律存在的必然性，但这一论证并不成功，它也包含着克服内在主义问题的一些启示。在《道德形而上学的基础》第三章中提到的这些暗示之一是“理性的自然倾向”。有人认为，这一暗示可以提供线索，以释放理性从自以为是的内在主义。少

Previous attempts to conceive of a "foundation of morals" have differed in their results because of the scholars' different definitions of morality. However these projects all included the reference to "Internalistic character of morals". That means, it would be difficult to justify morality with reasons extrinsic to morality and also those justifications end in circulation within the morality. And that also means that morals can only bind the people who accept the moral system itself.This 'Internalistic character of morals", however, is not so obvious in the history of ethics. Ancient and medieval ethics in particular has such conditions as "man's true end" or "The law of God", and under these conditions, "why should man be moral?", was not serious problem. The reason for this was, under the aforementioned conditions it was proper for man to be moral. But in the modern period, a new type of theology (Protestant or Jansenist) asserted that reason can supply no genuine comprehension of … More man's true end, and in fact the modern ethics could not postulate such premises as "man's true end". So for modern ethics it has become necessary to justify the morals and explain why man should be moral. Nevertheless many modern ethical theories, such as Contract theory or Utilitarianism, considered morals to be means to some ends, for example "to happiness", hence the justification of morality was externalistic and therefore incomplete.In these circumstances, Kant tried and failed to deduce a moral law and later asserted, in his "Critique of practical Reason", that moral law was "The fact of reason". This was a precise enunciation of Internalism. But his Internalism was criticized for its dogmatic thought and for the exclusive and rigoristic character of its morality. On the other hand, Kant's unsuccessful argument, which had tried to deduce the necessity of moral law, contains some hints to overcome the problems of Internalism. One of these hints, referred to in chapter 3 of "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals", is the "Natural tendency of reason". It will be argued that this hint can supply clues to release reason from the self-righteousness of Internalism. Less