CONFIDENCE AND CRITIQUE ; MORAL OBJECTIVITY AND RELATIVITY OF IN VIRTUE ETHICS

义务伦理学和功利主义是典型的现代问题。从普遍理性的观点来看，两者都旨在建立一些控制道德行为的原则。然而，现代伦理学所推导出的原则在实际道德问题的许多方面带来了没完没了的分歧。此外，在任何具体和实际情况下，它们在认知或传导反应方面几乎没有任何效果。由于这个原因，美德伦理学最近引起了我们的关注，它认为传统、习俗和具体性在特定的道德行为中比原则更重要。然而，美德伦理的恢复可能导致不加批判和顽固的保守主义。那么，在所谓的现代启蒙之后，如何能够论证美德伦理的可能性呢？因此，道德的相对性和客观性是我们当前关注的问题；其论点如下：1。人类“终极目标”（即人的真正目的或本质）的丧失，用现代伦理取代了古代美德。目前的研究表明，继康德之后，在这种情况下，美德也必须包含在义务论伦理学中。针对“幸福”或“权利”等“单薄概念”过于抽象而无法解决任何实际问题的批评，本文考虑了将现代伦理学重新定位到作为先验唯心主义的（内在）现实主义舞台上的估计可能性，以整合美德伦理学和自由主义。被观点束缚的内在现实主义可以超越自身的局限，批判自己，而不是通过任何外在的观点，而是通过（在一个人内部）从一个人参与的各种社区带来的不同语境中获得的多元方面。

Deontological ethics and utilitarianism are of typical modern concern. From a viewpoint of universal rationality, both intended to establish some principle that controls moral conducts. The principles which modern ethics have deduced, however, brought about many aspects of interminable disagreements on practical moral issues. Furthermore they proved scarcely any effectiveness on cognitive or conductive response required on any specific and practical situation. For that reason, virtue ethics which estimates tradition, custom and concreteness as more important than principle in given moral conducts, has lately attracted our concern. Restoration of virtue ethics, however, might cause the uncritical and obstinate conservatism. How can it be possible, then, after so-called modern enlightenment, to argue on the possibility of the virtue ethics?Relativity and objectivity of morality, then, is our current concern ; which is argued along the points as follows :1.The loss of human "telos" (i.e.man's true end or essential nature) replaced the ancient virtues with the modern ethics. The present research shows that, following Kant, under such circumstances, virtues must be also contained by deontological ethics.2.Against the criticism which claims that such a "thin concepts" as "happiness" or "right" are too abstract to solve any practical problem, estimated possibilities are considered as to relocating modern ethics on the stage of (internal) realism as transcendental idealism, in order to integrate virtue ethics and liberalism.3.Internal realism bound by a viewpoint can go beyond its limitation and criticize itself, not by any external point of view, but by means of plural aspects that (within a person) can be obtained from different contexts brought by varieties of communities in which a person participate.