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A STUDY ON MORAL THEORY AS INTERNAL REALISM AND THE REALITY OF FREEDOM

作为内在现实主义和自由现实的道德理论研究

基本信息

批准号：
10610030
负责人：
USAMI Kosei
金额：
$ 1.28万
依托单位：
Iwate University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
1998
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
1998 至 2000
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

In the modern tendency toward subjectivism, it is difficult to maintain the naive moral realism. It was a specific character of the modern period that people became aware of the limitation of reason and of the relativity of culture, and also that people began to talk about the human nature and human purpose not from a God's point of view but from a life-sized viewpoint. In these situation, the purpose what one should pursuit depended on only the interests of individuals, not on what moral theory requires, whereas modern moral theory was concerned only with the rules for social behavior and the principles for distribution. But the principles which modern ethics have deduced, brought about many aspects of interminable disagreements on practical moral issues. Furthermore they proved scarcely any effectiveness on cognitive or conductive response required on any practical situation. For that reason, virtue ethics and moral realism, which estimate custom and reality of value, have lately attracted our concern. Restoration of virtue ethics and moral realism, however, might cause the uncritical conservatism or the privileged expert ethics. So the possibility of another type of moral realism, which could conform to the modern multiple values, is our concern and it was found that the Putnam's internal realism and Kant's empirical realism as transcendental idealism would make for it. And upon the internal realism, we argued as follows ;1. By adopting the internal realism, we could approve the reality of multiple values, but in the modern ethical situation, the most important issue is how we can let freedom have reality.2. To let freedom have realty means that we ought to assure the freedom substantially which make possible each one to stand one's own feet.3. A.Sen's capability approach would be useful for the assurance of substantial freedom, But to bring up the cognitive ability on freedom, it is necessary to approach from another perspectives (ex. responsibility).

在现代主观主义倾向下，朴素的道德现实主义难以维持。近代的一个特点是人们开始意识到理性的局限性和文化的相对性，人们开始从人的角度而不是从上帝的角度来讨论人性和人的目的。在这种情况下，人们所追求的目的只取决于个人的利益，而不是道德理论所要求的，而现代道德理论只关心社会行为的规则和分配原则。但是，现代伦理学所推导出的原则，在实际的道德问题上带来了许多方面的无休止的分歧。此外，他们证明几乎没有任何有效性的认知或传导反应所需的任何实际情况。因此，评价习俗和价值现实的美德伦理学和道德现实主义近来引起了我们的关注。然而，德性伦理学和道德现实主义的复兴可能会导致不加批判的保守主义或特权专家伦理。因此，我们关注的是另一种符合现代多元价值观的道德实在论的可能性，并发现普特南的内在实在论和康德的经验实在论作为先验唯心主义可以为这种道德实在论提供可能。采用内在实在论，我们可以肯定多元价值的实在性，但在现代伦理情境中，最重要的问题是如何让自由具有实在性.让自由具有现实性，意味着我们应该从实质上保证使每个人都有可能自立的自由。A.森的能力观对保障实质自由是有益的，但要培养对自由的认知能力，还需要从另一个角度（如：责任）。