Cognitional Behavior and Economic Welfare

研究的结果是在消费者记忆有限的情况下对广告竞争进行建模，并基于全记忆的元偏好进行福利分析。我们选择消费项目本身作为记忆的目标，并考虑广告信息提醒人们某一消费项目的存在的过程。为了解释这种情况，我们假设消费者的品味是动态变化的，竞争是在消费者的工作记忆中对边缘消费项目的竞争。我们首先建立了一个一般模型，其中消费者的动态品味是耐用的好品型的，他们有限的记忆受到惯性的影响，我们还假设每个消费者最多有一个企业的广告信息到达的过程。为了对包括价格选择在内的竞争进行静态分析，我们重复了夏皮罗提出的例子，作为迪克西特和诺曼福利标准的反例。在这种情况下，一般的动态分析是复杂的，我们只列出奇异解。另一种尝试是研究单个企业的决策情况。我们追逐两个非政府组织之间的竞选竞争，其中一个非政府组织的广告水平是固定的，作为这次尝试的设置。分析了非政府组织广告水平的振荡行为，福利效应取决于消费者对活动的评价。最后，我们分析了固定价格、消费者具有随机偏好和独立记忆的厂商之间的动态广告竞争情况。借助于马尔可夫完全均衡，我们得到了一个显式解，它再次产生了一个振荡行为。比较静态属性似乎非常复杂，借助数值分析，我们发现当企业的广告技术成功地保护其客户不受其他企业的竞选信息影响时，会产生负福利效应，但这种效应并不普遍。

Upshot of the research is to model advertising competition when consumers' memories are limited, and to conduct welfare analysis based upon full-memory "meta"-preference. We chose items of consumption themselves as objectives of memory, and consider the process where advertising message remind people of the presence of a certain consumption item. To justify such situation, we hypothesized dynamically changing tastes of consumers, and competition is over the space in the working memory of consumers on marginal items of consumption.We first developed a general model where consumers dynamic taste is of durable good type, and their limited memories are under influence of inertia Also we assumed that there is a process by which at most one of the firms' advertising messages reach each consumer. For a static analysis of competition including the choice of price, we duplicated the example raised by Shapiro as a counterexample to the Dixit and Norman's welfare criterion. General dynamic analysis in this case is complex and we only list singular solutions.Another attempt is to investigate the case of single firm's decision. We chase campaign competition among two NGO's where one NGO's advertising level is fixed, as the setup for this attempt. We found out oscillatory behavior of NGO's advertising level, and welfare effect depends upon consumers valuation on the activity campaigned.Finally, we analyzed the case of dynamic advertising competition among firms with fixed price and with random preference and independent memories on the side of consumers. By means of Markov Perfect Equilibrium, we came up with an explicit solution which yielded an oscillatory behavior again. Comparative static property seemed very complex, and aided by numerical analysis, we found negative welfare effect when firm's advertising technology successfully shields its client from other firm's campaign message, but this effect is not nay universal.