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Strategic Effects of R」ヲD Investments

R”WOD 投资的战略效应

基本信息

批准号：
09630044
负责人：
IMAI Haruo
金额：
$ 1.15万
依托单位：
KYOTO UNIVERSITY
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
1997
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
1997 至 1999
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-09630044/
关键词：
R&D Bargaining Problems Licensing Imperfect Information 不完備情報

项目摘要

In this research, we investigate the effect of R&D investments on the bargaining over licensing a technology between technologically advanced and trailing firms, as well as the role of information and the patent system. Besides, we intend to deal with theoretical issues in the related field of bargaining games.In our main model based upon infinite time horizon and agents' ability to cope with sufficiently complex strategies, efficiency could be improved by licensing possibilities. The result is analogous to the one in repeated games but has not been recognized in this bargaining context, as the setting is somewhat different.In this last year of the project, we examined the issue of information-the effect of observability of the R&D investment level, and the finite life of a patent. In each case, it was verified that the effect has the expected sign, while a detailed analysis cannot be carried out due to the multiplicity of the solution or the patterns.As for the lack of observability of R&D investment level, one can confirm that licensing incentive weakness as the effect of investment over bargaining becomes tenuous. However, the situation is one of the signaling games and so a plethora of equilibria emerges corresponding to diversity of the patterns of expectations.Also the finite life of patent yields the well-expected effect of reducing the incentive for licensing. However, the incentive does not necessarily change monotonically with the length of the patent and depending on the shape of investment cost growth, lengthening the life could induce no deal.As to the theoretical aspects, we have launched a project examining theoretical framework in which many technologically advanced and trailing nations, banding together respectively, bargain over technology transfer in the context of investment in the CO2 emission reduction projects in an attempt to mitigate the global warming problem.

在本研究中，我们调查的R&D投资的影响，在技术先进的和落后的企业之间的技术许可的讨价还价，以及信息和专利制度的作用。此外，我们打算处理讨价还价游戏的相关领域的理论问题，在我们的主要模型基于无限的时间范围和代理人的能力，以科普足够复杂的战略，效率可以提高许可的可能性。其结果与重复博弈的结果类似，但由于设置的不同，在讨价还价的情况下没有得到承认。在项目的最后一年，我们研究了信息的问题--研发投资水平的可观测性的影响和专利的有限寿命。在每一种情况下，效果都得到了验证，但由于解决方案或模式的多样性，无法进行详细的分析。至于R&D投资水平的可观测性不足，可以确认，作为投资超过谈判效果的许可激励薄弱。然而，这种情况是一种信号博弈，因此出现了过多的均衡对应的期望模式的多样性。专利的有限寿命产生了预期的效果，减少了许可的激励。然而，专利的激励并不一定随着专利的期限而单调变化，而且取决于投资成本增长的形态，延长专利的期限可能导致没有交易。在理论方面，我们启动了一个项目，研究理论框架，在这个框架中，许多技术先进和落后的国家，分别联合起来，在投资二氧化碳减排项目的背景下就技术转让进行谈判，以缓解全球变暖问题。