A study of types and cognitive functions of representation from an interactionist perspective

我从互动主义的角度研究了表征在认知中所起的作用。研究结果如下。(1)认知分为两组，一组需要陈述，另一组不需要。在后一组中，有机体与其环境之间有一种密切的相互作用，这可以被充分地描述为一个动态过程，而前一组包括一个被充分描述为表征的转换或刺激到某种内在状态的收敛的过程。(2)至少有三种表征：具有句法结构的符号表征，具有生产性的符号表征，唤起与被表征对象相似的知觉的图画表征，以及不分解地代表合成事物的分布式表征。(3)相对较低水平的生物环境交互作用，如感知或行走，通过分布式表征实现，而相对…更高层次的交互，如由计划或推理促成的，是由符号表示实现的。图画表征通过唤起与物体所唤起的知觉相似的知觉来实现对被表现物体的准知觉体验。(4)思维包括符号表征，知觉包括分布式表征。因此，思维具有概念性内容，可以进行理性推理，而知觉具有非概念性内容，而非概念性内容则没有。因此，感知不能成为产生任何想法的理由。然而，一种知觉可以证明它所引起的思想是正当的，因为当知觉是真的时候，思想就是真的。(5)视觉、听觉、触觉等不同感觉方式的知觉使用不同类型的表征。因此，对莫利纽克斯的问题的答案是否定的。然而，代表相同事物的不同意义形式的表征有被纳入同一概念的趋势。这种倾向确保了客观世界的独特性在概念上得到保障。较少

I have studied what roles representation plays in cognition from an interactionist perspective. The results are as follows. (1)Cognition is divided into two groups, one requiring representation and the other not. In the latter group there is an intimate interaction between an organism and its environment that is adequately described as a dynamical process, while the former group includes a process which is adequately described as transformations of representations or a convergence of stimuli into a certain inner state. (2)There are at least three types of representation ; symbolic representations which have syntactic structure and so are productive, pictorial representations which evoke a perception similar to the one evoked by the represented object, and distributed representations which represent composite things without decomposing. (3)The relatively low level of organism environment interaction such as perception or walking is enabled by distributed representations while the relati … More vely high level of interaction such as mediated by a plan or inference is enabled by symbolic representations. Pictorial representations enable a quasi perceptual experience of the represented object by evoking a perception similar to the one evoked by the object. (4)Thought includes symbolic representation while perception includes distributed one. Therefore thought has conceptual content which enables rational inference while perception has nonconceptual content which does not. As a consequence, perception cannot be a reason for having any thought. Nevertheless a perception can justify the thought which it causes in the sense that the thought is true when the perception is true. (5)Perceptions in different sense modalities such as vision, audition or touch employ different types of representation. Therefore the answer to the Molyneux's question is negative. However representations in different sense modalities which represent the same things have a tendency to be accommodated into the same concept. This tendency ensures that the uniqueness of the objective world is conceptually secured. Less