Norm and Inequality from mathematical sociology perspective

在研究报告中，我考察了罗尔斯、巴里和森关于平等和正义的讨论，以阐明规范理论中“公平”一词的确切含义。很明显，“公平”被认为是一种含义非常明确，无需解释的东西。这是相当奇怪的，考虑到公平的概念在这些讨论中发挥了关键作用，以证明每个理论中提出的规范和/价值。为了找到“公平”概念的日常概念，我们考察了公平判断的经验理论，如公平理论或地位价值理论。该报告讨论了公平（日语为Kouhei），其本质形式是“只要每个人都有相同的资格，就平等对待他们”的秩序。然后，正式证明了公平顺序可以表示为两级函数或两个函数的组合，其中一个函数规定了分配的细节，而另一个函数定义了公平考虑的范围（应该包括谁，即谁是“每个人”）。本文主要讨论了不公平的形式特征及其含义与公平判断领域普遍主义演进的关系。

In the research report, I examined discussions on equality and justice by Rawls, Barry, and Sen in order to elucidate what exactly has been meant by the word "fairness (Kouhei in Japanese)" in the normative theories. It became clear that "fairness" was regarded as something whose meaning is so clear that it is unnecessary to explain. This is rather strange, considering the fact that concept of fairness played a key role in those discussions for justifying the norm and/value advanced in each theory. In order to find the daily conception of "fairness" concept, experiential theories of fairness judgments, such as equity theory or status value theory, were then examined.The report discusses that fairness (Kouhei in Japanese), in its essential form, is the order that "treat everyone identically as far as they have identical qualifications". Then, it is shown formally that order of fairness can be expressed as a two-level function or a combination of two functions, one of which dictates the specifics of allocation while the other defining the range of fairness consideration (who should be included, i.e., WHO IS "EVERYONE"). Formal characteristics of unfairness and its implications are discussed mainly in its relation with evolution of universalism in the realm of fairness judgment.