Designing Institutions to Cope with Global Warming : Theory and Experiments

全球变暖问题是我们必须应对的最重要的问题之一。在本研究项目中，我们运用微观经济学理论、实验经济学、国际关系、博弈论和社会模拟等多种方法，研究了如何有效、公平地设计减少温室气体排放的制度。《京都议定书》将排放权交易作为实现国家温室气体排放目标的机制之一。如果温室气体排放许可以竞争性均衡价格进行交易，议定书的目标可以有效实现。然而，议定书规定，排放交易必须作为减少温室气体排放的国内行动的补充。我们研究了排放交易中的这一补充问题，并表明当排放许可的需求方和供给方都可以在交易中设置数量限制时，没有国家使用排放交易的情况是一种均衡。本文还运用经济学实验方法，分析了温室气体减排投资的不确定性对市场效率的影响、排放交易与碳税的比较、排放交易中的买方责任和卖方责任以及上游温室气体排放交易实现《京都议定书》目标的最优性。此外，我们还研究了如何在考虑参与者激励的情况下设计有效提供公共产品（如减少温室气体排放）的机制。如果无论其他代理如何行为，每个代理都诚实行事而不说谎是最优的，那么这种机制就被称为防策略机制。我们从理论和实验的角度重新审视了策略证明机制

The Global Warming problem is one of most important issues we have to cope with. In this research project, we have studied how to design institutions to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) effectively and fairly by using various methods based on mico-economic theory, experimental economics, international relations, game theory, and social simulation.The Kyoto Protocol authorizes emissions trading as one of mechanisms in order to implement national emission targets for GHGs. The goal of the Protocol could be achieved efficiently if GHGs emissions permits were traded at the competitive equilibrium price. However, the Protocol specifies emissions trading must be supplement to domestic actions in reducing GHGs emissions. We have examined this supplementarity issue in emissions trading and showed that when both demanders and suppliers for emissions permits can set quantity restraints in trading, the situation in which no country uses emission trading is an equilibrium.By using the economic experimental method, we have also analyzed how uncertainty in investment for reducing GHGs affects market efficiency, the comparison between emissions trading and carbon taxes, buyer's liability and sellers liability in emissions trading, and the optimality of upstream GHGs emissions trading to achieve the goal of the Kyoto Protocol.Moreover, we have studied how to design mechanisms for the efficient provision of public goods such as reducing GHGs, taking account of participants' incentives. If it is optimal for each agent to behave honestly, not to tell a lie, regardless of how the other agents behave, then such a mechanism is called strategy-proof. We have re-examined strategy-proof mechanisms in both theoretical and experimental points of view