Game Theoretical Foundation of Collusion : Factors other than self-interests and role of private information

笔者运用机制设计和重复博弈的方法研究了串通和竞争的可能性。我明确考虑到这样一个事实，即真正的个人不一定为了自己的物质利益而行事，他们受到与其物质利益无关的因素的影响，他们使用私人信息并仅限于获取公共信息。最重要的贡献是题为《私人监督下的重复博弈：两个玩家》的论文，这篇论文作为常规文章发表在《计量经济学》杂志上，以及题为《附带支付的机制设计：个人理性和迭代支配地位》的论文，被《经济理论杂志》作为常规文章接受。这两种期刊都在经济学理论期刊中名列前茅。其他论文如《廉洁在执行中的作用》则涉及到物质利益以外的因素问题。发表在《日本经济评论》上的题为《无细节的机制设计与合理性》的论文，是作为日本经济协会Nakahana奖的演讲文章撰写的。

I investigated the possibility of collusion and competition by using the approaches of mechanism design and repeated games. I took into account explicitly the fact that real individuals do not necessarily behave for their own material interests, the fact that they are influenced by information about factors irrelevant to their material interests, and the fact that they use private information and are limited to access public information. The most important contributions are the paper entitled "Repeated Games with Private monitoring : Two Players," which was published in Econometrica as a regular article and the paper entitled "Mechanism Design with Side Payments : Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance", which was accepted in Journal of Economic Theory as a regular article. Both journals are top among the economics theory journals. Other papers such as "Role of Honesty in Implementation" is related to the issue of the problem of factors other than the material interests. The papers entitled "Detail-Free Mechanism design and Rationality", which was published in Japanese Economic Review, was written as the lecture article for the Nakahana Awards of the Japanese economic association.