Managing Regional Economic Risks due to the Entry and Exit of Global Firms

这项研究提出了一种理论，即跨国公司进出当地城市的行为会放大全球经济风险对区域经济的影响。该理论采用动态期权博弈框架来捕捉地主针对跨国公司进入/退出当地城市的星战行为。分析表明，房东的均衡策略是当经济因素的波动性足够小时允许企业立即进入，在企业自由退出规则下的均衡中，房东随着波动性的增加而提高租金，以弥补由于企业退出风险增加而导致的预期收入的减少。通过比较土地所有者可能的策略，我们进一步揭示了不赋予企业退出选择是帕累托主导策略，因为企业和土地所有者的境况都更好。

This study presents a theory that the entry and exit behavior of global firms to/from a local city amplifies global economic risks to a regional economy. The theory employs the dynamic option game framework for capturing landwoner's starategic behaviors against the entry/exit of a global firm to a local city. The analysis reveals that the landlord's equilibrium strategy is to permit the firm's entry immediately when the volatility of the economic factor is sufficiently small, and that in the equilibrium under the firm's free exit rule, the landlord raises the rent as the volatility increases to cover the decrease in his expected revenue due to the increase in the risk of firm's exit. Comparing landowner's possible strategies, we further disclose that not endowing the firm with the exit option is the Pareto dominant strategy in the sense that the firm as well as the landowner are better off.