Game theoretic analysis for collective choice problems and the strategy-proofness

这项研究是关于集体选择规则，即在给定每个人对备选方案的偏好的情况下，选择备选方案集的子集。如果某个人在诚实的情况下，通过伪造自己的偏好，能够获得他更喜欢的单一结果，那么这个过程是可操纵的。不可操纵的投票规则被称为战略防范。特别是，本研究重点研究了不受策略影响的集体选择规则。主要结果表明，Pareto规则在极大极小意义下是联合防策略的，具有联合防策略和非强加性质的最大规则是Pareto规则。

This research is about collective choice rules that choose a subset of alternative set, given each individual's preference over the alternatives. If some individual can secure a single outcome that he prefers to the single outcome when he is honest by falsifying his preference, the procedure is manipulable. Nonmanipulable voting rules are called strategy-proof. In particular, this study focused on the strategy-proof collective choice rules. The main results show that Pareto rule is coalitionally strategy-proof in a max-min sense, and that the maximal rule with the coalitionally strategy-proofness and nonimposition property is the Pareto rule.