On location problem of public facilities by collective choice model

基于集体选择模型的公共设施选址问题

• 批准号: 23510184
• 负责人: UMEZAWA Masashi
• 金额: $ 2万
• 依托单位: Tokyo University of Science
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2011 至 2013
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-23510184/
• 关键词: ゲーム理論; 公共施設; 社会的選択; 意思決定; 社会工学; 社会選択

When agents are located on a network, the provision of public goods is considered. Each agent has a single-peaked preference. We showed that if there were at least four agents on a tree network, then no social choice rule existed that satisfied efficiency and replacement-domination. Efficiency is an axiom meaning Pareto optimality. Replacement-domination is an axiom in relation to the idea of solidarity among agents when changes in preferences occur. In fact, these properties were shown to be incompatible, even if agents' preferences were restricted to a smaller domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences.Moreover, it was shown that if agents' peak locations were restricted to either the nodes or the endpoints of trees, rules existed on a subclass of trees. We gave a characterization of a family of such rules for this tree subclass.

当代理位于网络上时，考虑公共产品的提供。每个代理都有一个单峰偏好。我们证明了如果树网络上至少有四个代理，则不存在满足效率和替换支配的社会选择规则。效率是一个公理，意思是帕累托最优。当偏好发生变化时，替代支配是一种公理，与代理人之间团结的想法有关。事实上，这些性质被证明是不相容的，即使代理的偏好被限制在对称单峰偏好的较小区域内，并且证明了如果代理的峰值位置被限制在树的节点或端点，则规则存在于树的子类上。我们给出了这个树子类的一族这样的规则的刻画。

项目成果

On licensing agreement with a rival firm in a differentiated Cournot market

在差异化的古诺市场中与竞争对手公司签订许可协议

• 发表时间: 2013
• 作者: M. Umezawa;T. Kitagawa;Y. Masuda
• 通讯作者: Y. Masuda

ネットワーク上の複数公共施設配置問題に対する社会選択ルールについて

关于网络上多个公共设施放置问题的社会选择规则

• 发表时间: 2012
• 作者: Ken-ichi TANAKA;Ryuhei MIYASHIRO and Yuichiro MIYAMOTO;山本秀男;梅澤 正史
• 通讯作者: 梅澤 正史

The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks

• DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1593383
• 发表时间: 2009-12
• 期刊: Social Choice and Welfare
• 影响因子: 0.9
• 作者: M. Umezawa

Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival

• DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.011
• 发表时间: 2014-05
• 期刊: Economics Letters
• 影响因子: 2
• 作者: Tatsuya Kitagawa;Y. Masuda;M. Umezawa

クールノー複占市場における競合企業へのライセンス供与契約

与古诺双寡头市场竞争对手的许可协议

• 发表时间: 2013
• 作者: 増田靖;北川達也;梅澤正史
• 通讯作者: 梅澤正史