Legal Structure of Monitoring in Public Procurement

本研究探讨了监督采购机构及其做法的有效方法（并试图找到需要解决的新问题），以提高日本公共采购的竞争力和效率。本研究所针对的机构和程序是，例如，JFTC，财政部，以及最高价格制度和个人诉讼。例如，该研究明确指出，采购机构为了保持竞争力而隐瞒最高价格或最低价格，会导致独断专行、腐败和反竞争，最高价格本身具有监督各机构合理使用预算的作用。这可能是未来的一个重要问题。

This study examines effective ways of monitoring procuring agencies and their practices (and tries to find new problems to be solved) to promote competitiveness and efficiency in public procurement in Japan. The targeted institutions and procedures in this study are, for example, JFTC, the MOF, as well as the ceiling price system and lawsuits by individuals. This study has made clear, for example, that hiding the ceiling price or the lowest price by procuring agencies in a bid to maintain competitiveness leads on the contrary to arbitrariness, corruption, and anti-competitiveness, and that the ceiling price itself has had the role of monitoring agencies' appropriate spending of their budgets. This will likely be an important issue in future.