Monetary Policy under Imperfect Common Knowledge: Theory and Experimental Evidence

本项目旨在扩展动态随机一般均衡（DSGE）模型，以分析宏观经济冲击和货币政策对不完善的共同知识的影响。价格、工资或信息的刚性可以解释货币政策的非中性和经济对冲击的缓慢调整。目前，粘性信息提供了与观测数据的脉冲响应函数的最佳拟合。然而，这种方法受到了批评，因为它假设在每个时期只有一小部分公司能够获得新信息，而实际上相关信息是公开的。相反，观察到的行为可以更好地解释，假设代理人采用有限程度的合理性（高阶信念）在他们的预期对其他agents.In这个项目中，我们将应用模型的战略不确定性，将有限水平的高阶信念的货币政策模型，特别是DSGE模型。我们想回答的问题是，它们是否产生了与观测数据可接受的脉冲响应函数拟合（可能比粘性价格模型更好），我们的替代建模方法是否意味着最优货币政策的不同策略，这些策略是什么，以及央行透明度如何影响高阶信念的程度。

This project aims at extending dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models for analyzing the impact of macroeconomic shocks and monetary policy towards imperfect common knowledge. Rigidities in prices, wages or information can explain non-neutrality of monetary policy and sluggish adjustments of the economy to shocks. Currently, sticky information delivers the best fit of impulse response functions with observed data. However, this approach is criticized for its assumption that in each period only a fraction of firms has access to new information, while in reality relevant information is publicly available.Experimental evidence shows that public information does not lead to common knowledge. Instead, observed behaviour can be better explained by assuming that agents employ limited degrees of rationality (higher order beliefs) in their expectations about the beliefs of other agents.In this project, we will apply models of strategic uncertainty that incorporate limited levels of higher order beliefs to models of monetary policy, in particular DSGE models. We want to answer whether they yield an acceptable fit of impulse response functions with observed data (potentially better than the sticky price model), whether our alternative modelling approach implies different strategies for optimal monetary policy, what these strategies are, and how the degree of higher order beliefs can be affected by central bank transparency.