Wittgenstein on Sensations and Subjectivity

维特根斯坦对感觉和主体性的处理是他哲学的核心要素。他对感觉和“私人语言”的讨论一直被认为是维特根斯坦哲学研究的关键因素。它为维特根斯坦后期广泛的心理学哲学工作设定了议程，其发展可以追溯到20世纪30年代维特根斯坦的著作。理解维特根斯坦对感觉的处理对于理解他的整体哲学是至关重要的。理解它的发展是理解他的观点发展的核心。《维特根斯坦，感觉和主体性》的目的是对维特根斯坦对感觉和主体性的处理进行新的描述，并对其在20世纪30年代维特根斯坦作品中的发展进行新的描述。该项目还将为维特根斯坦的主体性观点与当代心灵哲学观点之间的关系提供一个新的视角。这些目标将通过三个相互关联的研究线来实现，每个研究线将导致一篇单独撰写的论文。研究的第一行，“感觉和主体性：哲学评论和大打字稿”，将考虑维特根斯坦在《哲学评论》（1929-30）和《大打字稿》（1933-37）中对感觉和主体性的处理，并探索这些著作在维特根斯坦观点发展中的地位。在这些早期的著作中，维特根斯坦考虑了另一种术语来将经验归因于自己和他人——将“我在痛苦中”替换为“有痛苦”，而将“a在痛苦中”替换为“a的行为就像我在痛苦时的行为一样”。该项目将研究如何最好地理解维特根斯坦从这个想象的替代术语中吸取的教训。它将检验这些早期关于感觉的讨论和维特根斯坦后期作品中对感觉的处理之间的关系。它将探索一种解释的合理性，这种解释使《哲学评论》和《大打字稿》中对感觉的处理更接近维特根斯坦后来对这一主题的处理，而不是通常认为的那样。研究的第二条线，“维特根斯坦，现象概念，并知道它是什么样子”，将发展维特根斯坦对感觉概念的处理的新描述-特别是讨论，在维特根斯坦对感觉概念的掌握的描述中，一个人自己对感觉的拥有所起的作用。许多当代作家认为，拥有一种特定的感觉，使人能够掌握这些感觉的现象概念：一种思考这种感觉的方式，只有那些知道拥有这种感觉是什么样子的人才能获得。现象概念的拥护者通常认为他们的观点与维特根斯坦的观点截然不同。该项目将通过对文本的详细讨论来证明，维特根斯坦关于感觉概念的观点实际上与现象概念的观点是一致的，即使维特根斯坦拒绝了现代现象概念支持者的一些其他观点。研究的第三条线，“维特根斯坦关于经验和经验的行为表达”，将提供维特根斯坦对感觉和感觉的行为表达之间关系的处理的说明，为维特根斯坦提出的关系的解释辩护，这种解释远没有人们通常认为的那么极端。维特根斯坦经常被解读为这样一种观点：对于任何一种感觉或情感来说，它所具有的行为表达都是必不可少的。根据这种观点，一个没有痛苦、恐惧或快乐的特征表达的世界，将是一个没有痛苦、恐惧或快乐的世界。我们将看到，维特根斯坦的实际观点比这要弱得多，也要可信得多。

Wittgenstein's treatment of sensations and subjectivity is a central element in his philosophy. His discussion of sensations and 'private language' has long been recognized as a key element in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. It sets the agenda for his extensive late work on philosophy of psychology, and its development can be traced through Wittgenstein's writings of the 1930s. Understanding Wittgenstein's treatment of sensations is crucial for understanding his philosophy as a whole. And understanding its development is central to understanding the development of his views more generally.The aim of 'Wittgenstein, Sensations, and Subjectivity' is to develop a new account of Wittgenstein's treatment of sensations and subjectivity, and a new account of its development in Wittgenstein's writings of the 1930s. The project will also offer a fresh perspective on the relation between Wittgenstein's view of subjectivity and contemporary views in philosophy of mind. These aims will be pursued through three interrelated lines of research, each leading to a single-authored paper. The first line of research, 'Sensations and Subjectivity: Philosophical Remarks and The Big Typescript', will consider the treatments of sensations and subjectivity that Wittgenstein offers in Philosophical Remarks (1929-30) and The Big Typescript (1933-37), and explore the place of these writings in the development of Wittgenstein's views. In these early writings, Wittgenstein considers an alternative terminology for ascribing experiences to oneself and others - a terminology in which 'I am in pain' is replaced by 'There is pain', while 'A is in pain' is replaced by 'A is behaving as I behave when there is pain'. The project will examine how best to understand the lessons Wittgenstein draws from this imagined alternative terminology. It will examine the relation between these early discussions of sensations and the treatment of sensations in Wittgenstein's later work. And it will explore the plausibility of an interpretation that brings the treatments of sensations in Philosophical Remarks and The Big Typescript much closer to Wittgenstein's later treatment of the topic than they have generally been seen as being.The second line of research, 'Wittgenstein, Phenomenal Concepts, and Knowing What It's Like', will develop a new account of Wittgenstein's treatment of sensation concepts - discussing, in particular, the role that is played by a person's own possession of sensations in Wittgenstein's account of her grasp of sensation concepts. Many contemporary writers hold that having sensations of a given kind equips one to grasp a phenomenal concept of those sensations: a way of thinking of such sensations that is available only to those who know what it is like to have them. Advocates of phenomenal concepts have generally held their views to be sharply at odds with Wittgenstein's. The project will demonstrate, through detailed discussion of the texts, that Wittgenstein's view of sensation concepts is in fact compatible with the idea that there are phenomenal concepts, even if Wittgenstein rejects some of the other views of modern proponents of phenomenal concepts.The third line of research, 'Wittgenstein on Experience and the Behavioural Expression of Experience', will offer an account of Wittgenstein's treatment of the relation between sensations and the behavioural expression of sensation, defending an interpretation on which the relation Wittgenstein proposes is much less extreme than has often been thought. Wittgenstein is often read as holding that it is essential to any kind of sensation or emotion that it has the kind of behavioural expression it does. On this view, a world in which there was no characteristic expression of pain, fear, or joy, say, would be a world in which there was no pain, fear, or joy. It will be shown that Wittgenstein's actual view is much weaker - and much more plausible - than that.