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Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind

维特根斯坦的心灵哲学

基本信息

批准号：
AH/F00320X/1
负责人：
Timothy Child
金额：
$ 3.28万
依托单位：
University of Oxford
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Research Grant
财政年份：
2008
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2008 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FF00320X%2F1
关键词：
Wittgenstein Philosophy Mind

项目摘要

The project will investigate four, linked topics in Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind. The immediate aim is to increase our understanding of some important areas of Wittgenstein's philosophy and to use his work to make progress on questions of current interest in the philosophy of mind. A subsidiary aim is to challenge the view that Wittgenstein's work is completely opposed to contemporary philosophy of mind (a view which is shared by many admirers of Wittgenstein and by his detractors). The areas for research are as follows:1. 'Remembering Intentions'. We normally know what we believe, desire, mean and intend. And we know it immediately (without inference) and authoritatively. Philosophical accounts of self-knowledge have generally focused entirely on our knowledge of our present mental states. But Wittgenstein observes that we often have a similarly immediate and authoritative knowledge of our past mental states. We can often directly remember what we believed or intended at some past time - even in cases where we never acted on that belief or intention: as, for example, when I remember what I was going to say when I was interrupted; or when I remember that, for a moment, I was going to deceive you, but then thought better of it. I shall discuss Wittgenstein's account of what is involved in remembering one's past mental states and defend a broadly Wittgensteinian account as a contribution to the contemporary philosophical debate.2. 'Expression, Criteria, and the Methodology of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind'.Wittgenstein emphasizes that the ascription and self-ascription of sensations and mental states is built on a foundation of natural, prelinguistic expressions of sensations and attitudes. And he seems to give a central role to the idea that the meanings of words for mental states must be explained by reference to the behavioural criteria on the basis of which we ascribe such states to others. These ideas persistently prompt the charge that Wittgenstein is really a behaviourist, and that his view of the meanings of mental words is thoroughly implausible. That in turn leads many contemporary philosophers to conclude that his views are outdated and have little to contribute. Supporters of Wittgenstein regard these criticisms as mistaken: but they rarely respond properly to the substance of the complaints. I shall argue that Wittgenstein's actual views about 'behavioural criteria' differ from the views defended by 'Wittgensteinians' and attacked by critics; and, I shall argue, that interpretation is supported by a proper account of Wittgenstein's appeal to natural prelinguistic expression. 3. The Tractatus and the private language argument.Wittgenstein famously argues, in Philosophical Investigations, that there could not be a purely private sensation language, a language whose words got their meanings by standing for 'immediate, private sensations'. How far back can we trace the 'private language argument' in Wittgenstein's philosophy? It has recently been claimed that key elements of the argument are already implicit in Wittgenstein's early book, the Tractatus. I shall argue against that claim: partly on internal grounds; and partly by comparing the Tractatus with the discussions of sensation language in Wittgenstein's immediate post-Tractatus writings. 4. Wittgenstein's response to William James and Wolfgang Köhler.Many of Wittgenstein's discussions of mental phenomena start with reaction to claims made by psychologists - notably in the writings of James and Köhler. The literature on Wittgenstein makes occasional references to those writings. But it rarely sets out James's and Köhler's views in their own right or develops the overall contrast between their views and Wittgenstein's. I shall offer a study of Wittgenstein's relation to James and Köhler, designed to promote a better, historically-informed understanding of the context and development of Wittgenstein's views.

该项目将调查路德维希·维特根斯坦的心灵哲学中的四个相互关联的主题。直接的目的是增加我们对维特根斯坦哲学的一些重要领域的理解，并利用他的工作在心灵哲学中当前感兴趣的问题上取得进展。一个次要的目的是挑战维特根斯坦的工作是完全反对当代心灵哲学的观点（一个观点，这是由维特根斯坦的许多崇拜者和他的批评者共享）。本文的主要研究内容如下：1.“记住意图”。我们通常知道我们相信什么、渴望什么、想要什么和想要什么。我们知道它是直接的（没有推论）和作者。自我认识的哲学解释通常完全集中在我们对当前心理状态的认识上。但维特根斯坦观察到，我们经常对我们过去的精神状态有类似的直接和权威的知识。我们常常能直接回忆起过去某个时候我们所相信或打算做的事情--即使在我们从未按照这种信念或意图行事的情况下也是如此：例如，当我想起我正要说什么时，我被打断了;或者当我想起来的时候，有那么一刻，我想欺骗你，我将讨论维特根斯坦对回忆一个人过去的精神状态所涉及的内容的解释，并为一个广义上的维特根斯坦的解释辩护，作为对当代的贡献。哲学辩论。《维特根斯坦心灵哲学的表达、标准和方法论》。维特根斯坦强调感觉和精神状态的归属和自我归属是建立在感觉和态度的自然的、语言前的表达的基础上的。他似乎把一个中心的角色给了这个想法，即精神状态的词的含义必须通过参考行为标准来解释，我们在此基础上把这种状态归因于他人。这些观点不断地促使人们指责维特根斯坦实际上是一个行为主义者，他关于心理词汇的意义的观点完全令人难以置信。这反过来又导致许多当代哲学家得出结论，认为他的观点已经过时，没有什么贡献。维特根斯坦的支持者认为这些批评是错误的：但他们很少正确地回应投诉的实质。我将论证，维特根斯坦关于“行为标准”的实际观点不同于“维特根斯坦主义者”所捍卫和批评家所攻击的观点;而且，我将论证，这种解释得到了对维特根斯坦诉诸自然的前语言表达的适当解释的支持。3.维特根斯坦在《哲学研究》中提出了一个著名的论点，即不可能有一种纯粹的私人感觉语言，这种语言的词语通过代表“直接的、私人的感觉”而获得其意义。维特根斯坦哲学中的“私人语言论证”可以追溯到多远？最近有人声称，维特根斯坦的早期著作《逻辑哲学论》中已经隐含了这一论点的关键要素。我将反驳这一主张：一部分是基于内在的理由;一部分是通过将《逻辑哲学论》与维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》之后的著作中对感觉语言的讨论进行比较。4.维特根斯坦对威廉·詹姆斯和沃尔夫冈·科勒的回应维特根斯坦对心理现象的许多讨论都是从对心理学家的主张的回应开始的，特别是在詹姆斯和科勒的著作中。关于维特根斯坦的文献偶尔会提到这些著作。但它很少阐述詹姆斯和科勒的观点本身或发展他们的观点与维特根斯坦的观点之间的整体对比。我将提供维特根斯坦与詹姆斯和科勒的关系的研究，旨在促进对维特根斯坦观点的背景和发展的更好的，历史上知情的理解。