Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind

该项目将研究路德维希·维特根斯坦心灵哲学中的四个相关主题。其直接目的是增加我们对维特根斯坦哲学的一些重要领域的理解，并利用他的工作在当前对心灵哲学感兴趣的问题上取得进展。一个次要的目标是挑战维特根斯坦的工作完全反对当代心灵哲学的观点（许多维特根斯坦的崇拜者和他的批评者都有这种观点）。研究的领域如下：1。“记住的意图”。我们通常知道我们相信什么，渴望什么，意味着什么，意图什么。我们立即（没有推论）和权威地知道它。哲学对自我认识的描述通常完全集中在我们对当前精神状态的认识上。但维特根斯坦观察到，我们经常对自己过去的精神状态有类似的直接和权威的认识。我们经常能直接记住我们过去的信念或意图——即使在我们从未按照信念或意图行事的情况下：例如，当我被打断时，我记得我要说什么；或者当我想起，有那么一会儿，我想要欺骗你，但后来又想起来了。我将讨论维特根斯坦关于记忆一个人过去的精神状态所涉及的内容，并为维特根斯坦的广泛描述辩护，认为这是对当代哲学辩论的贡献。维特根斯坦心灵哲学的表达、标准和方法论维特根斯坦强调，感觉和心理状态的归因和自我归因是建立在感觉和态度的自然、语言前表达的基础上的。他似乎认为，精神状态的词语含义必须参照行为标准来解释，在此基础上，我们将这种状态归因于他人。这些观点不断地促使人们指责维特根斯坦实际上是一个行为主义者，他对精神词汇的意义的看法是完全不可信的。这反过来又导致许多当代哲学家得出结论，认为他的观点已经过时，没有什么贡献。维特根斯坦的支持者认为这些批评是错误的，但他们很少对这些抱怨的实质作出适当的回应。我将论证维特根斯坦关于“行为标准”的实际观点不同于“维特根斯坦学派”所捍卫并受到批评者攻击的观点；而且，我将论证，这种解释是由维特根斯坦对自然前语言表达的呼吁的适当描述所支持的。3. 论和私人语言的争论。维特根斯坦在《哲学研究》中提出了一个著名的观点，即不可能存在一种纯粹的私人感觉语言，这种语言的词语通过代表“直接的、私人的感觉”来获得意义。我们可以追溯到维特根斯坦哲学中的“私人语言论证”多久以前？最近有人声称，这个论点的关键要素已经隐含在维特根斯坦的早期著作《哲学论文集》中。我将反对这种说法：部分是出于内部原因；部分是通过比较《论》和维特根斯坦后《论》作品中关于感觉语言的讨论。4. 维特根斯坦对威廉·詹姆斯和沃尔夫冈的回应Köhler。维特根斯坦对心理现象的许多讨论都是从对心理学家的主张的反应开始的——尤其是在詹姆斯和Köhler的著作中。关于维特根斯坦的文献偶尔会提到这些著作。但它很少单独阐述詹姆斯和Köhler的观点，或者发展他们的观点与维特根斯坦的观点之间的整体对比。我将提供维特根斯坦与詹姆斯和Köhler的关系的研究，旨在促进对维特根斯坦观点的背景和发展的更好的，历史信息的理解。

The project will investigate four, linked topics in Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind. The immediate aim is to increase our understanding of some important areas of Wittgenstein's philosophy and to use his work to make progress on questions of current interest in the philosophy of mind. A subsidiary aim is to challenge the view that Wittgenstein's work is completely opposed to contemporary philosophy of mind (a view which is shared by many admirers of Wittgenstein and by his detractors). The areas for research are as follows:1. 'Remembering Intentions'. We normally know what we believe, desire, mean and intend. And we know it immediately (without inference) and authoritatively. Philosophical accounts of self-knowledge have generally focused entirely on our knowledge of our present mental states. But Wittgenstein observes that we often have a similarly immediate and authoritative knowledge of our past mental states. We can often directly remember what we believed or intended at some past time - even in cases where we never acted on that belief or intention: as, for example, when I remember what I was going to say when I was interrupted; or when I remember that, for a moment, I was going to deceive you, but then thought better of it. I shall discuss Wittgenstein's account of what is involved in remembering one's past mental states and defend a broadly Wittgensteinian account as a contribution to the contemporary philosophical debate.2. 'Expression, Criteria, and the Methodology of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind'.Wittgenstein emphasizes that the ascription and self-ascription of sensations and mental states is built on a foundation of natural, prelinguistic expressions of sensations and attitudes. And he seems to give a central role to the idea that the meanings of words for mental states must be explained by reference to the behavioural criteria on the basis of which we ascribe such states to others. These ideas persistently prompt the charge that Wittgenstein is really a behaviourist, and that his view of the meanings of mental words is thoroughly implausible. That in turn leads many contemporary philosophers to conclude that his views are outdated and have little to contribute. Supporters of Wittgenstein regard these criticisms as mistaken: but they rarely respond properly to the substance of the complaints. I shall argue that Wittgenstein's actual views about 'behavioural criteria' differ from the views defended by 'Wittgensteinians' and attacked by critics; and, I shall argue, that interpretation is supported by a proper account of Wittgenstein's appeal to natural prelinguistic expression. 3. The Tractatus and the private language argument.Wittgenstein famously argues, in Philosophical Investigations, that there could not be a purely private sensation language, a language whose words got their meanings by standing for 'immediate, private sensations'. How far back can we trace the 'private language argument' in Wittgenstein's philosophy? It has recently been claimed that key elements of the argument are already implicit in Wittgenstein's early book, the Tractatus. I shall argue against that claim: partly on internal grounds; and partly by comparing the Tractatus with the discussions of sensation language in Wittgenstein's immediate post-Tractatus writings. 4. Wittgenstein's response to William James and Wolfgang Köhler.Many of Wittgenstein's discussions of mental phenomena start with reaction to claims made by psychologists - notably in the writings of James and Köhler. The literature on Wittgenstein makes occasional references to those writings. But it rarely sets out James's and Köhler's views in their own right or develops the overall contrast between their views and Wittgenstein's. I shall offer a study of Wittgenstein's relation to James and Köhler, designed to promote a better, historically-informed understanding of the context and development of Wittgenstein's views.