Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind

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The project will investigate four, linked topics in Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind. The immediate aim is to increase our understanding of some important areas of Wittgenstein's philosophy and to use his work to make progress on questions of current interest in the philosophy of mind. A subsidiary aim is to challenge the view that Wittgenstein's work is completely opposed to contemporary philosophy of mind (a view which is shared by many admirers of Wittgenstein and by his detractors). The areas for research are as follows:1. 'Remembering Intentions'. We normally know what we believe, desire, mean and intend. And we know it immediately (without inference) and authoritatively. Philosophical accounts of self-knowledge have generally focused entirely on our knowledge of our present mental states. But Wittgenstein observes that we often have a similarly immediate and authoritative knowledge of our past mental states. We can often directly remember what we believed or intended at some past time - even in cases where we never acted on that belief or intention: as, for example, when I remember what I was going to say when I was interrupted; or when I remember that, for a moment, I was going to deceive you, but then thought better of it. I shall discuss Wittgenstein's account of what is involved in remembering one's past mental states and defend a broadly Wittgensteinian account as a contribution to the contemporary philosophical debate.2. 'Expression, Criteria, and the Methodology of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind'.Wittgenstein emphasizes that the ascription and self-ascription of sensations and mental states is built on a foundation of natural, prelinguistic expressions of sensations and attitudes. And he seems to give a central role to the idea that the meanings of words for mental states must be explained by reference to the behavioural criteria on the basis of which we ascribe such states to others. These ideas persistently prompt the charge that Wittgenstein is really a behaviourist, and that his view of the meanings of mental words is thoroughly implausible. That in turn leads many contemporary philosophers to conclude that his views are outdated and have little to contribute. Supporters of Wittgenstein regard these criticisms as mistaken: but they rarely respond properly to the substance of the complaints. I shall argue that Wittgenstein's actual views about 'behavioural criteria' differ from the views defended by 'Wittgensteinians' and attacked by critics; and, I shall argue, that interpretation is supported by a proper account of Wittgenstein's appeal to natural prelinguistic expression. 3. The Tractatus and the private language argument.Wittgenstein famously argues, in Philosophical Investigations, that there could not be a purely private sensation language, a language whose words got their meanings by standing for 'immediate, private sensations'. How far back can we trace the 'private language argument' in Wittgenstein's philosophy? It has recently been claimed that key elements of the argument are already implicit in Wittgenstein's early book, the Tractatus. I shall argue against that claim: partly on internal grounds; and partly by comparing the Tractatus with the discussions of sensation language in Wittgenstein's immediate post-Tractatus writings. 4. Wittgenstein's response to William James and Wolfgang Köhler.Many of Wittgenstein's discussions of mental phenomena start with reaction to claims made by psychologists - notably in the writings of James and Köhler. The literature on Wittgenstein makes occasional references to those writings. But it rarely sets out James's and Köhler's views in their own right or develops the overall contrast between their views and Wittgenstein's. I shall offer a study of Wittgenstein's relation to James and Köhler, designed to promote a better, historically-informed understanding of the context and development of Wittgenstein's views.