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Digital Knowledge: A New Framework for Digital Epistemic Virtues

Digital Knowledge: A New Framework for Digital Epistemic Virtues
数字知识:数字认知美德的新框架
批准号:
AH/W008424/1
负责人:
Joseph Adam Carter
金额:
$103.18万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
英国
项目类别:
Research Grant
财政年份:
2022
资助国家:
英国
项目状态:
未结题
起止时间:
2022 至 --

项目摘要

项目成果

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中文摘要
翻译
我们越来越多地陷入信息流行病的泥潭,而持续的新冠肺炎疫情--以及网上健康错误信息的传播,沿着对专家日益增加的不信任--只会以悲剧性的方式突显这一点。我们的项目以解决信息流行病为出发点,不仅需要认真对待其症状,还需要认真对待其根本原因-这属于社会认识论的范围,研究知识如何共享,以及个人如何成为更负责任的信息消费者。那些在网上分享假新闻的人往往把自己说成是值得信赖和消息灵通的人,这种方式不仅可能很容易欺骗专门的阴谋论者,而且也可能欺骗那些不善于区分可靠和不可靠来源的人。科学研究表明,网上错误信息的传播速度更是让这个问题雪上加霜。例如,2018年对Twitter转发的一项研究表明,虚假谣言在所有类别的信息中比真相传播得更远、更快、更深、更广。大多数学术研究和政策举措都侧重于治疗这种信息流行病的症状,而不是原因。一个旨在打击虚假信息传播的突出政治策略采取了删除内容(Facebook)和审查违反社交媒体政策条款(Twitter)的海报的形式。这种策略有重要的缺点,因为有证据表明,在媒体消费者没有特权这样做的理由的情况下,简单地隐藏内容或禁止用户本身就会加剧阴谋思维模式,从而进一步加剧问题。更有甚者,内容删除政策实际上只制裁违反现有在线规范的行为;这些政策既没有确定问题的根源,也没有明确地概述积极的规范。项目团队将使用社会认识论和美德认识论(研究智力性格特征和认知能力的哲学领域)的最新工具,以便将我们对在线查询和信息共享的理解置于全新的基础上,更好地了解在线认知风险的来源,并更好地训练自己熟练地驾驭它们。以前的认识论方法对在线信息流行病的一个限制是,他们把理论重点放在脑内认知上,与我们深深和不可分割的技术隔离开来。这种关注并不令人惊讶,因为传统的认识论只是在过去十年左右的时间里--在PI和Co-I的工作的推动下--开始以一种欣赏良好思维在许多情况下与良好的认知支架无法明确分离的方式来理论化知识和智力美德,也就是说,从良好和负责任的方式依赖于我们的环境和技术,以促进我们的智力目标。本项目开发了一个新的创新框架,用于理论化数字认知美德和恶习-思想家的特征,使他们能够更好地在线导航信息,更好地评估在线认知风险,并更有效地将数字信息转换为数字知识。除了学术成果外,该项目还有一个实际目标,即与教育家和政策制定者合作,提出新的和创新的方法,我们可以教育数字美德,并以这种方式将我们的理论付诸实践。
英文摘要
We are increasingly in the grips of an information epidemic, which the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic - and the spread of health misinformation online along with rising distrust of experts - has only served to highlight with tragic emphasis. Our project takes as a starting point that addressing the infodemic requires serious engagement not only with its symptoms but also with its fundamental causes - which fall within the remit of social epistemology, which studies how knowledge is shared, and how individuals can become more responsible consumers of information. Those who share fake news online often present themselves as trustworthy and well-informed, in a way that might easily deceive not only dedicated conspiracy theorists, but also those unskilled at distinguishing reliable from unreliable sources. The problem is amplified even further by what science has shown about the spread rate of online misinformation. For example, a 2018 study of Twitter retweets showed that false rumours circulated significantly 'farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all categories of information'. Most academic research and policy initiatives have focused on treating symptoms of this infodemic rather than the causes. One prominent political strategy aimed at combatting the spread of disinformation has taken the form of deleting content (Facebook) and censoring posters who violate social media terms of policy (Twitter). Such strategies have important shortcomings, as there is evidence that simply hiding content or banning users in cases where the media consumer is not privileged to the rationale for doing so can itself exacerbate conspiratorial thinking patterns, thus, furthering the problem. Even more, content removal policies effectively only sanction violations of existing norms online; such policies neither identify the source of the problem, nor clearly outline positive norms. The project team will use the latest tools of social epistemology and virtue epistemology (the area of philosophy that studies intellectual character traits and cognitive faculties) in order to put our understanding of online inquiry and information sharing on an entirely new footing, to better understand the sources of online epistemic risk, and to better train ourselves to navigate them skilfully. One limitation to previous epistemological approaches to the online infodemic is that they have placed the theoretical focus on brainbound cognition, in isolation from the technologies in which we are deeply and inextricably scaffolded. This kind of focus is unsurprising, given that traditional epistemology has only in the past decade or so - and driven by work by the PI and Co-I - begun to theorise about knowledge and intellectual virtues in a way that appreciates how good thinking is not clearly separable in many cases from good cognitive scaffolding, that is, from good and responsible ways of relying on our environments and on technology to further our intellectual goals. The present project develops a new and innovative framework for theorizing about digital epistemic virtues, and vices - traits of thinkers that can enable them to better navigate information online, better assess online epistemic risk, and more efficiently convert digital information into digital knowledge. In addition to academic outputs, the project has a practical objective, which is to work with educationalists and policy makers in order to propose new and innovative ways we can educate for digital virtues, and in this way, to put our theory into practice.
期刊论文(10)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Intentional action and knowledge-centered theories of control
有意行动和以知识为中心的控制理论
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-022-01904-4
发表时间: 2023
期刊: Philosophical Studies
影响因子: 1.3
作者: [Carter J]
通讯作者: Carter J
DOI: --
发表时间: 2023
期刊:
影响因子: --
作者: [Carter, J A]
通讯作者: Carter, J A
DOI: --
发表时间: 2024
期刊:
影响因子: --
作者: [Carter J. Adam]
通讯作者: Carter J. Adam
The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd Edition
布莱克威尔认识论伴侣,第三版
DOI: --
发表时间: 2023
期刊:
影响因子: --
作者: [Carter, J A]
通讯作者: Carter, J A
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