DeepSecurity - Applying Deep Learning to Hardware Security

随着供应链的全球化，当今电子设备的设计和制造现在分布在世界各地，例如，通过使用海外代工厂，第三方知识产权（IP）和第三方测试设施。在设计和组装阶段可能涉及许多不同的不可信实体，因此，确保设备的完整性和真实性变得越来越困难。供应链现在被认为容易受到一系列基于硬件的威胁，包括硬件特洛伊木马、IP盗版、集成电路（IC）生产过剩或回收、逆向工程、IC克隆和旁道攻击。这些攻击是军事、医疗、政府、交通和其他关键和嵌入式系统应用的主要安全威胁。拟议的项目将使用一种通用的方法来调查其中两种威胁，即在侧信道攻击和硬件木马的背景下使用深度学习。侧信道攻击（SCA）利用加密实现中的物理信号泄漏，如功耗，电磁辐射或时序特征，并且已经成为许多实际现实世界演示的严重安全问题，例如从公共交通票务应用中使用的MifareDESFire智能卡和Xilinx Virtex-4/5 FPGA上的加密位流中恢复密钥。硬件特洛伊木马（HT）是一种恶意修改电路，以控制，修改，禁用，监视或影响电路的操作。虽然没有公开报道在实践中发现HT，但在2008年，有人推测叙利亚雷达的严重故障可能是通过商业现货（COTS）微处理器内的隐藏“后门”故意触发的。该项目旨在研究深度学习在SCA和HT检测中的应用，最终目标是在电子设计自动化工具中利用基于深度学习的验证过程，为设计人员提供有关其设计安全性的反馈。该项目旨在应对“通过开发过程保持对安全的信心”的挑战，更具体地说，是“建立供应链信心”和“新的硬件分析工具集和技术”。

With the globalisation of supply chains the design and manufacture of today's electronic devices are now distributed worldwide, for example, through the use of overseas foundries, third party intellectual property (IP) and third party test facilities. Many different untrusted entities may be involved in the design and assembly phases and therefore, it is becoming increasingly difficult to ensure the integrity and authenticity of devices. The supply chain is now considered to be susceptible to a range of hardware-based threats, including hardware Trojans, IP piracy, integrated circuit (IC) overproduction or recycling, reverse engineering, IC cloning and side-channel attacks. These attacks are major security threats to military, medical, government, transportation, and other critical and embedded systems applications. The proposed project will use a common approach to investigate two of these threats, namely the use of deep-learning in the context of side-channel attacks and hardware Trojans.Side-channel attacks (SCAs) exploit physical signal leakages, such as power consumption, electromagnetic emanations or timing characteristics, from cryptographic implementations, and have become a serious security concern with many practical real-world demonstrations, such as secret key recovery from the Mifare DESFire smart card used in public transport ticketing applications and from encrypted bitstreams on Xilinx Virtex-4/5 FPGAs. A hardware Trojan (HT) is a malicious modification of a circuit in order to control, modify, disable, monitor or affect the operation of the circuit. Although there have been no public reports of HTs detected in practice, in 2008 it was speculated that a critical failure in a Syrian radar may have been intentionally triggered via a hidden 'back door' inside a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) microprocessor. The proposed project seeks to investigate the application of deep learning in SCA and HT detection, with the ultimate goal of utilising deep learning based verification processes in Electronic Design Automation tools to provide feedback to designers on the security of their designs. In relation to the call, the project addresses the challenge of 'maintaining confidence in security through the development process', and more specifically 'building supply chain confidence' and 'novel hardware analysis toolsets and techniques'.