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The new bail-in doctrine: from an agent based model to the empirical findings

The new bail-in doctrine: from an agent based model to the empirical findings
新的内部纾困主义:从基于代理人的模型到实证结果
批准号:
1946997
负责人:
金额:
$0.0万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
英国
项目类别:
Studentship
财政年份:
2017
资助国家:
英国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2017 至 --

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中文摘要
翻译
序言:“塞浦路斯纾困计划中储户首次受到惩罚”这是2013年3月许多报纸头条之一,解释和评论这种史无前例的银行资本重组形式。塞浦路斯成为第一个将自救政策工具作为其经济调整方案一部分的欧洲国家,当时两家最大的商业银行的未参保储户为其银行的清盘和资本重组贡献了存款。
英文摘要
Preamble:"Depositors punished for the first time in Cyprus bailout plan" This was one of many newspaper headlines in March 2013 explaining and commenting on the unprecedented form of bank recapitalisation. Cyprus became the first European country where the bail-in policy tool was used as a part of its Economic Adjustment Programme when uninsured depositors to the two largest commercial banks contributed their deposits for the resolution and recapitalization of their banks.
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