Autonomy, Adaptive Preferences & Pornography

虽然女权主义理论家似乎一致认为，压迫阻碍了主体实现自治的心理和社会条件，但对于为什么、在何种条件下以及在何种程度上，仍然存在分歧。一个女权主义者的硬案例揭示了这个问题，那就是适应性偏好：即潜意识形成的偏好，以减少来自未满足的欲望的认知失调感。我研究的目的是评估在什么条件下适应性偏好实际上与自主性兼容，以及为什么兼容。特别值得一提的是，有一个案例启发了我的论文，那就是选择出演色情片的女性是否会自主选择，即使这可能会导致她们自己的屈服。这个问题是由像弗里德曼这样的女权主义思想家提出的，它突出了关于色情的哲学辩论的关键领域，但却相对未被触及。正因为如此，我相信这样一个研究领域将对正在进行的关于色情是否可以被视为女权主义或解放的哲学和政治辩论，以及关于什么是自主选择的更广泛的辩论做出原创性贡献。如果决定出演色情作品的背景是一种压迫，那么这种压迫制度可能会影响人们可以用来做出真正选择的批判性反思。这是否妨碍了我们的自主？这些问题与当今社会有关，色情作品的可访问性推动了对其生产者，消费者和更广泛社会的影响的研究；尤其是当女权主义者越来越意识到父权结构，并寻求如何最好地解决它们的时候。我相信，回答这些问题的方法是通过女权主义批判和对支持和反对适应性偏好的争论的哲学分析。例如，埃尔斯特采取了一种程序性的方法，认为适应性偏好阻碍了自主性，因为它们是错误形成的。我认为，当我们考虑到每个行动者都是其社会化的产物，而不仅仅是被压迫者时，埃尔斯特对适应性偏好形成和合理偏好形成的区分就不成立了。克里斯特曼试图解决这个问题，他建议这种程序性方法应该关注欲望如何决定行为的产生的历史：如果一个最低限度理性的行为人在欲望形成的时候不反对，那么她的欲望所带来的选择实际上是她自己的选择。然而，Elster和Christman方法的内容中立性也是他们最大的弱点，因为它容易受到操纵问题的影响。我认为，即使是克里斯特曼的方法也无法回避这个问题，因为它无法解释在边缘化主体中根深蒂固的压迫性规范，这些规范导致主体本身不反对压迫性欲望的形成。正因为如此，我的目标是建立一个不受操纵问题影响的自主性程序描述。我将从自主性的对比方法中得出结论，以强调为什么我们可以认为适应性偏好本身是自主的：也就是说，像加内特这样的“自主程度”方法表明，智能体可以选择自主非自主——也就是说，尽管智能体可能缺乏一阶自主性，但它们仍然可以被视为具有二阶自主性。有了这些基础思想，我的目标是捍卫适应性偏好可以与程序性账户下的自主性相容的说法。最终，揭示了一个问题，即女性是否能够自主选择出演色情作品，即使这有助于她们自己的征服。同时也促成了更广泛的关于色情是否可以是女权主义的争论，以及什么构成了自主选择。

While there seems to be a consensus among feminist theorists that oppression hinders an agent's psychological and social conditions for autonomy, there remains a divide over why, under which conditions and to what extent. A feminist hard-case bringing this problem to light is that of adaptive preferences: that is, preferences that are subconsciously formed to reduce feelings of cognitive dissonance that come from unsatisfied desires.The aim of my research is to assess under what conditions adaptive preferences are in fact compatible with autonomy, and why. In particular, a case that has inspired my thesis is that of whether women who chose to star in pornography do so autonomously, even if it arguably contributes to their own subjugation. This question, posed by concerned feminist thinkers like Friedman, highlights key areas of philosophical debate over pornography, but has been left relatively untouched. Because of this, I believe such an area of research would be an original contribution to the ongoing philosophical and political debate over whether pornography can be considered feminist or liberating, as well as the wider debate of what precisely constitutes an autonomous choice. If the context in which the decision to star in pornography is made in is one of oppression, then such oppressive systems may affect the critical reflection which one can use to make a genuine choice. Does this then impede us from being autonomous? Such questions are pertinent to today's society where the accessibility of pornography has pushed for studies over its impact on its producers, consumers, wider society alike; especially as feminists have become more aware of patriarchal structures, and look to how best to tackle them. It is my belief that the way to answer these questions is through feminist critique and philosophical analysis of the arguments for and against adaptive preferences. Elster, for example, takes a procedural approach, arguing that adaptive preferences hinder autonomy because they are formed erroneously. I will argue that the distinction Elster makes between adaptive and legitimate preference formation falls apart when we consider that every agent is a product of their socialisation, not just the oppressed. Christman has sought to counter this problem by suggesting that such procedural approaches should focus on the history of how desires that determine actions come about: if a minimally rational agent would not object were she present at the point of desire formation, then the choices that follow from her desires are indeed her own. Yet, the content-neutral nature of Elster and Christman's approaches is also their greatest weakness as it falls prey to the problem of manipulation. I argue that even Christman's approach is not able to side-step this problem because it is unable to account for the oppressive norms so deeply ingrained in marginalised agents that lead to the agents themselves not objecting to oppressive desires being formed.Because of this, my aim is to build a procedural account of autonomy that does not fall prey to the problem of manipulation. I will draw from contrasting approaches to autonomy to highlight why we can argue that adaptive preferences are autonomous in their own right: Namely, 'degrees of autonomy' approaches such as Garnett's, suggest that an agent can choose to be autonomously non-autonomous - that is, while agents can lack first-order autonomy, they can still be seen as having second-order autonomy. With these underpinning ideas in mind, my aim is to defend the claim that adaptive preferences can be compatible with autonomy under procedural accounts. Ultimately, shedding light on the question of whether women are able to autonomously choose to star in pornography even if it contributes to their own subjugation. As well as contributing to the wider debates of whether pornography can be feminist, and what constitutes an autonomous choice.