Formulating a Probabilistic Argument from Divine Hiddenness and Seeking Empirically Informed Solutions

这个项目将集中在对上帝的信仰的反对上，被称为从神的隐藏(Schellenberg，1993)的论点，它现在已经成为当代宗教哲学中对上帝存在的主要哲学反对。我的工作将寻求扩大关于这个主题的讨论，看看如何使用概率推理而不是演绎推理来重新阐述神圣隐蔽性的论点(Drange，1993；Schellenberg，2007,2015)。虽然这种类型的方法已经被应用于并加强了对反对上帝存在的其他论点的讨论，例如来自邪恶的论点(Draper，1989,2011；Toey，1991,2019；Rowe，1979)，但几乎没有这种类型的工作被应用于来自神的隐蔽性的论点(Maitzen，2006)。鉴于越来越多的人意识到神圣的隐藏在远离邪恶的争论之外所做出的独特贡献(安德森，即将出版)，我的工作将通过提出一个来自神圣隐藏的新的概率论点来弥补这种对神圣隐藏的缺乏关注。此外，我将使用认识论、宗教心理学和宗教认知科学的工具和发现来探索这个新论点的潜在解决方案，主要集中在个人可能遗漏或没有可用的证据的非罪责方式上。在认识论上，这将取决于向x提供证据是否意味着x将收到证据(Anderson，2017,2018)。在宗教心理学中，我将研究不同类型的偏见推理如何影响对上帝的信仰问题，以及信息处理的差异如何影响证据集。(申哈夫、兰德和格林，2012年；洛巴托等人，2020年)。最后，在宗教认知科学中，我将重点讨论宗教信仰的所谓自然性(McCauley，2011)及其对神圣隐蔽性的影响。虽然我的研究将在方法上有所创新，至少部分依赖于经验数据，但我仍将使用当代分析哲学家的方法：概念分析。除了将关于神的隐藏的对话从目前文学中的僵局转向更有成果的对话之外，例如，我在认识论和宗教心理学方面的研究将对法律制度等领域产生深远影响。了解偏见如何运作以及不同的个人或团体可能如何处理证据，是改革有关法庭诉讼和陪审团审判的政策的关键组成部分。此外，我对宗教认知科学的研究将探索宗教信仰的一些进化基础。例如，探索引起宗教信仰的认知机制可以帮助社会学家理解和预测影响社会变化的因素。

This project will focus on an objection to belief in God called the Argument from Divine Hiddenness (Schellenberg, 1993), which has now become the leading philosophical objection to God's existence in contemporary philosophy of religion. My work will seek to enlarge the discussion on this topic by looking at how the Argument from Divine Hiddenness can be reformulated using probabilistic reasoning, rather than deductive reasoning (Drange, 1993; Schellenberg, 2007, 2015). While this type of approach has been applied to and enhanced discussion of other arguments against God's existence, such as the Argument from Evil (Draper, 1989, 2011; Tooley, 1991, 2019; Rowe, 1979), virtually no work of this type has been applied to the Argument from Divine Hiddenness (Maitzen, 2006). Given increasing awareness of the unique contribution that Divine Hiddenness makes beyond the Argument from Evil (Anderson, forthcoming), my work will remedy this lack of attention on Divine Hiddenness by presenting a new probabilistic Argument from Divine Hiddenness.In addition, I will be using the tools and findings of epistemology, psychology of religion, and cognitive science of religion to explore potential solutions to this new argument, focusing primarily on non-culpable ways in which individuals might miss or fail to have available evidence. In epistemology, this will be on whether providing evidence to x entails that x will be in receipt of the evidence (Anderson, 2017, 2018). In psychology of religion, I will look at how types of biased reasoning bear on the question of belief in God along with how differences in information processing influences evidence sets. (Shenhav, Rand, and Greene, 2012; Lobato et al., 2020). And finally, in cognitive science of religion I will focus on the alleged naturalness of religious belief (Mccauley, 2011) and the implications this has for Divine Hiddenness.While my research will be methodologically innovative by, at least in part, relying on empirically informed data, I will still be using the methodology of contemporary analytical philosophers: conceptual analysis. Beyond moving conversation on Divine Hiddenness away from its current deadlock in the literature towards more fruitful dialogue, my research in epistemology and psychology of religion, for example, will have far-reaching implications to domains such as the legal system. Understanding how biases operate and how different individuals or groups may process evidence is a crucial component to reform policies concerning court proceedings and jury trials. Moreover, my research in the cognitive science of religion will explore some of the evolutionary underpinnings of religious belief. Exploring the cognitive mechanisms that give rise to religiosity can, for example, help sociologists understand and predictfactors affecting social change.