What Else Might We Learn from the Murderer? Towards a Kantian Ethics of Testimony

康德认为撒谎总是错误的。这通常被认为是一种过度反应。然而，尽管可能是杀人犯，康德对谎言的描述呈现了一个关于证词的道德品格的故事，值得认真对待。我打算进行的研究涉及如何将这一图景扩展并用于对证言认识论中进一步的规范性问题进行理论分析。现有的关于这一主题的工作，例如Alix Cohen(2014)和Seana Shiffrin(2014)，集中在对康德图景撒谎的独特性上。相比之下，我的项目确定了撒谎和其他成功演讲所需的合作被错误地破坏的情况之间的重要联系，但这种联系尚未形成理论基础。例如：1)不说谎的欺骗，不欺骗的‘光头’说谎。二)证言不公正，即偏见导致错误地不相信被边缘化的发言者的证词。三)沉默的形式，以及“证言扼杀”的形式，即在任何演讲之前发生的失火。研究目的康德的描述为理解这些其他形式的证言失败提供了一种强大的、系统的方法。我的主要目标是开发这个框架，并将其应用于以下问题：1)我们应该如何理解撒谎和其他著名的(错误的)演讲失败案例之间的联系？这种错误的性质是什么？(S)它在道德和认识论上有什么独特之处？2)在这个观点上，作证的目的、价值和品格是什么？相关概念，如可信度和信任度，是如何在这个故事中发挥作用的？这些概念与我们在证言交流中的义务有什么关系？3)这幅图说明了什么是认知主体，以及我们与其他认知主体的关系？那么认知机构在道德上是突出的呢？意义关于康德的道德哲学对证言的认识论的影响的问题本身就具有哲学意义。该项目还有可能对一些现象进行统一说明，目前对这些现象的讨论是零碎的。康德的方法对他们的道德和认识论元素是如何结合在一起的提出了更连贯的解释。此外，这个项目在女权主义哲学中是有意义的；特别是发现康德概念(例如对象化、尊严)的女权主义应用的传统。这个调查的核心是这样一个想法，即边缘化的一个场所是认识论领域：我们并不都被视为认识论上的平等，这一点在证词的提供和接受方式中表现得尤为突出。虽然我提出了一个理论框架，但它与政治上突出的“现实世界”现象有明显的相关性，例如沉默、公开的秘密(我们都知道一些我们不能讨论的事情)和窃窃私语网络(知识在其中传播，但必须保持非官方)。从社会正义的角度来看，重要的是理解和正确诊断这些案件。研究方法本研究借鉴了哲学文献中的两个实体：第一，康德道德哲学的发展和他对谎言的描述；第二，认识论方面的最新工作，强调证词的人际性，例如Shiffrin，Miranda Fricker(2007)和Richard Moran(2018)。我的方法是探索康德的描述，以此作为理解证词的这些特殊的、人际关系特征的途径。在广泛依赖康德的道德理论的同时，请注意，我认为这个项目是当代女权主义伦理学和认识论的作品。这与康德学术的传统是一致的，即主要致力于从康德的材料中重建最可信和最有说服力的哲学理论(即，与解释性项目相反，将康德作为历史哲学家来探讨)。

ContextKant thinks it is always wrong to lie. This is often considered something of an overreaction. Would-be murderers notwithstanding, however, Kant's account of lying presents a story about the moral character of testimony that is worth taking seriously. My intended research concerns how this picture can be extended and used to theorise about further normative questions in the epistemology of testimony.Existing work on this topic from, e.g., Alix Cohen (2014) and Seana Shiffrin (2014), focusses on the distinctiveness of lying on the Kantian picture. By contrast, my project identifies an important and as yet under-theorised connection between lying, and other cases where the cooperation required for successful speech is wrongfully undermined. For instance: i) Deception without lying, and 'bald-faced' lying, which does not deceive. ii) Testimonial injustice, where prejudice results in wrongful disbelief of marginalised speakers' testimony. iii) Forms of silencing, and 'testimonial smothering', where the misfire occurs before any speech. Research ObjectivesThe Kantian account promises a powerful, systematic approach for understanding these other forms of testimonial failure. My principal objective is to develop this framework, and apply it to the following questions:1) How should we understand the connection between lying, and other prominent cases of (wrongful) failed speech? What is the nature of this wrong? In what way(s) is it morally and epistemologically distinctive?2) On this view, what is the purpose, value, and moral character of testimony? How do related concepts, e.g. credibility and trust, feature into this story? How do these concepts relate to our obligations in testimonial exchanges?3) What account of epistemic agency, and our relations with other epistemic agents, does this picture suggest? What about epistemic agency is morally salient? SignificanceQuestions about the implications of Kant's moral philosophy for the epistemology of testimony are of philosophical interest in their own right. This project also has the potential to give a unified account of a number of phenomena, discussion of which is currently piecemeal. The Kantian approach suggests a more coherent explanation of how their moral and epistemological elements come together. Furthermore, this project is of interest within feminist philosophy; especially the tradition that finds feminist applications of Kantian notions (e.g. objectification, dignity).Central to this inquiry is the idea that one locus of marginalisation is the epistemic sphere: we are not all treated as epistemic equals, and this is seen prominently in how testimony is given and received. While I propose a theoretical framework, it has clear relevance to politically salient, 'real-world' phenomena, e.g. silencing, open secrets (where we all know something we cannot discuss), and whisper networks (where knowledge is transmitted, but must remain unofficial). It is important, from the perspective of social justice, to understand and properly diagnose these cases. MethodologyThis research draws on two substantial bodies on philosophical literature: firstly, work developing Kant's moral philosophy, and his account of lying; and, secondly, recent work in epistemology that emphasises the interpersonal nature of testimony from, e.g., Shiffrin, Miranda Fricker (2007), and Richard Moran (2018). My approach is to explore Kant's account as a route to understanding these special, interpersonal features of testimony. While relying extensively on Kant's moral theory, note that I regard this project as a work in contemporary feminist ethics and epistemology. This is in keeping with a tradition of Kant scholarship that is engaged primarily in the reconstruction of the most plausible and compelling philosophical theories from Kant's materials (i.e., in contrast to an interpretative project, inquiring into Kant as a historical philosopher).